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INTRODUCTION

First as Governor of Virginia (1926-30) and later as United States Senator (1933-65), Hany
Flood Byrd advocated fiscal conservatism and economic, efficient government. Byrd's
experiences in private enterprise and Virginia's conservative tradition shaped the principles that
guided his political career. When he rescued his father's paper from bankruptcy, Byrd learned the
values of individual initiative and fiscal responsibility. Both his father and his uncle belonged to
the Democratic organization of Thomas Staples Martin. Byrd entered state politics as the Martin
Organization began its decline and was most in need of leadership. By defeating opponents of
the "machine" and winning the voters' support for his pay-as-you-go plan, Byrd made a name for
himself in the Democratic party. He quickly rose from state senator to Governor of Virginia.
As governor, Byrd was praised for his progressive programs. He reorganized state
government, reformed the tax system, and brought national recognition and prosperity to
Virginia. By solidifying his control over the Virginia Democratic party, Byrd dominated state
politics long after leaving office. When Virginians voted Republican in the 1928 presidential
election, some questioned Byrd's leadership. Any doubts about his dominance were erased the
following year when voters endorsed Byrd's "Program of Progress" by electing his chosen
successor, John Garland Pollard.
When the Great Depression devastated the nation, Byrd endorsed Franklin Roosevelt's
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candidacy and supported the early days of the New Deal. However, Byrd's fiscal conservatism
soon clashed with many of Roosevelt's programs. To Byrd, the New Deal's bureaucratic
programs endangered individualism, balanced budgets, and states' rights. Throughout his
opposition to the Roosevelt administration, Byrd maintained that fiscally conservative policies,
not government spending, would restore economic prosperity. As the nation broke with the
economic and political philosophies of the past, Byrd's faith in balanced budgets, pay-as-you-go
financing, and limited, economical government remained as strong as ever.
Byrd's conservatism can be traced to the experiences of his youth. The Martin Organization's
origins dated back to the 1880s when the Readjusters and the conservative Funders battled over
the repayment of Virginia's pre-Civil War debt. From that day forward, the Democratic
Organization fought against future indebtedness. There are numerous sources which discuss how
these occurrences influenced Byrd's political ideology and the birth of his own political
"machine." Allen W. Moger analyzes the formation and characteristics of the state Democratic
Organization in his articles "The Origin of the Democratic Machine in Virginia" and "Virginia's
Conservative Political Heritage." Moger's Virginia: Bourbonism to Byrd also examines the roots
of the state Democratic party and focuses on early twentieth century events that affected the
Organization. Moger covers the state constitutional convention of 1901-02 that restricted the
electorate, the effect of prohibition on state politics, the Organization's challengers, and the rise
of Harry Byrd.
Historians have written about the Martin and Byrd machines in great detail. V.O. Key, in
Southern Politics in State and Nation analyzes how the Byrd machine controlled politics on the
state and local levels. He describes the Organization's characteristics and discusses the conflict
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that existed between the Organization and antiorganization factions within the state Democratic
party. The Transformation of Southern Politics by Jack Bass and Walter De Vries examines the
history of the Organization and includes observations by political reporter Charles McDowell of
the Richmond Times-Dispatch. J. Harvie Wilkinson's Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of
Virginia Politics begins with the history of the Organization's formation and then discusses the
role of the Byrd machine on the local, state, and national levels. Bill Tuck: A Political Life in
Harry Byrd's Virginia by William B. Crawley, Jr. describes Byrd political career and his
leadership of the Organization. Crawley examines the defining characteristics of the machines
which include support from the "court-house rings," an electorate restricted by the poll tax, and
the existence of a "voting elite."
The history of the Organization during the Progressive era is discussed in Southern
Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition by Dewey Granthan1. Grantham
describes Martin's leadership during this period, the "independent" opponents of the machine,
and Governor Westmoreland Davis's defeat of the Organization in 1917. Raymond Pulley's Old
Virginia Restored: An Interpretation of the Progressive Impulse, 1970-1930 stresses the
conservative nature of the progressive movement in Virginia. Pulley analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of Governor Byrd's "progressive" administration. The brand of progressivism that
Byrd espoused while governor is discussed in George B. Tindall's "Business Progressivism:
Southern Politics in the Twenties." Tindall maintains that the progressivism adopted by southern
leaders emphasized development and efficiency, rather than reform. Indeed, Byrd repeatedly
called for "economy" and "efficiency" as governor and reorganized state government to
accomplish these goals.
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Byrd's restoration of the Martin Organization after years of decline is covered in several
sources. Jack Temple Kirby's Westmoreland Davis: Virginia Planter-Politician, 1859-1942
analyzes Davis's defeat of the Organization, his governorship, and the machine's revival under
Byrd's leadership. Kirby also examines the accomplishments of the Byrd administration and
Davis's later support of the New Deal. Byrd's political skills and the birth of his Organization
are discussed in "The Redemption of the Fighting Ninth: The 1922 Congressional Election in
the Ninth District of Virginia and the Origins of the Byrd Organization" by Joseph A. Fry and
Brent Tarter.
The redemption of the Ninth and Byrd's successful campaign against bonds for highway
construction enabled Byrd to assume command of the Organization and run for governor only ten
years after entering state politics. Before he became governor, Byrd had influenced Virginia's
leaders and criticized those who opposed his policies. The Governors of Virginia, 1860-1978
includes articles about Byrd and the following men who preceded and succeeded him:
Westmoreland Davis, E. Lee Trinkle, John Garland Pollard, George C. Peery, and James Hubert
Price. These articles discuss varied topics including the Democratic Organization, Governor
Davis's rise and fall, the emergence of Harry Byrd as a political force, the formation of his pay
as-you-go policy, and Byrd's term in office. The Organization's approach to the Great
Depression and its opposition to Roosevelt's programs and the Virginia New Dealers are also
examined in these articles.
Byrd's term as governor is the focus of"The Emergence of a Leader: Harry Food Byrd,
Governor of Virginia, 1926-1930" by Robert Hawkes. Hawkes's dissertation "The Career of
Harry Flood Byrd, Sr. to 1933" analyzes the accomplishments of the Byrd administration, in
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addition to discussing Byrd's earlier political career and his involvement in state politics during
the Great Depression. Joseph Fry's "Senior Advisor to the Democratic 'Organization': William
Thomas Reed and Virginia Politics, 1925-1935" examines Byrd's relationship with the man who
advised Byrd on government reorganization. Fry also discusses Reed's conservatism and his
views on combating the depression. Sources that chronicle the Democratic losses in the 1928
presidential election and the Byrd Organization's victory the following year include "Rum,
Romanism, and Virginia Democrats: The Party Leaders and the Campaign of 1932" by James R.
Sweeney and Alvin Hall's "Virginia Back in the Fold: The Gubernatorial Campaign and Election
of 1929."
The most comprehensive source on Harry Byrd's political career is Ronald L. Heinemann's

Harry Byrd o_f Virginia. This biography examines Byrd's childhood, business career, and rise
within the Democratic Organization. Heinemann discusses the accomplishments and
shortcoming of Byrd's governorship. He describes Byrd's opposition to the New Deal and his
emerging role as a spokesman for conservative principles. "Harry Byrd for President: The 1932
Campaign," also written by Heinemann, covers Byrd's unsuccessful attempt to win the
Democratic nomination for president.

Depression and New Deal in Virginia: The Enduring Dominion by Heinemann is a detailed
discussion about the effects of the depression on Virginia and the Byrd Organization's opposition
to the New Deal. Heinemann describes how the depression affected Virginia and evaluates why
its impact was not felt as dramatically as in other states. Byrd's opposition to many of
Roosevelt's programs is analyzed by Heinemann. He also discusses the differences between the
Organization and the Virginia New Dealers. Their battle over federal patronage is the subject of
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several articles including: "Politics and Patronage: Virginia's Senators and the Roosevelt Purges
of 1938" by Alvin Hall and A. Cash Koeniger's "The New Deal and the States: Roosevelt versus
the Byrd Organization in Virginia." Virginius Dabney's Virginia: The New Dominion
summarizes Governor Byrd's administration and the effects of the depression and the New Deal
in Virginia.
Roger Biles's The South and the New Deal analyzes the changes brought to the region by the
programs of the Roosevelt administration. Biles covers the effects of the depression in the
South, various programs, and the racial policy of the New Deal. He devotes one chapter to
southern politics and the New Deal. Biles examines early support of the New Deal and then
traces southern disenchantment with Roosevelt's policies. In F.D.R. and the South, Frank
Freidel analyzes conservative opposition to the New Deal. He first discusses early support from
southerners and explores why they initially embraced the New Deal. He then describes emerging
divisions between conservatives and Roosevelt.
A good general source about the New Deal is William E. Leuchtenburg's Franklin Roosevelt
and the New Deal. Leuchtenburg analyzes the New Deal's evolution from 1932 to 1940. He

describes the programs and philosophy of the "Hundred Days" and discusses the many New Deal
programs. Other topics analyzed in the book include: leftist opposition to the New Deal, the
more liberal "second" New Deal, and Roosevelt's growing popularity. Leuchtenburg details the
New Deal's demise, beginning with the court-packing controversy and concluding with
conservative opposition to Roosevelt.
James Patterson's Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-39 and "A Conservative Coalition Forms in
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Congress" focus on the increasing conservative opposition to the New Deal. Patterson names
Byrd as one of earliest opponents of the Roosevelt administration. He analyzes how conservative
opposition grew in 1935 and increased following the court controversy. Patterson also describes
the characteristics of this impermanent coalition.
The conservatism that led Byrd to oppose the New Deal formed early in his life. His business
experiences and the traditionalism of the state Democratic party reinforced his political and
economic philosophy. As Byrd took control of the former Martin Organization, his fiscally
conservative pay-as-you-go policy became untouchable. Byrd did not abandon his conservative
principles during his governorship. However, the numerous accomplishments of his "business
progressive administration" were widely praised. Byrd's connections to progressivism ended
when he became a United States Senator. The Great Depression forced many Americans to
change their conceptions about the duties of government. Under the New Deal, government
activism increased to address the problems of a modern age. Opposing the policies of the
Roosevelt administration, Byrd argued for a return to the conservative principles that were more
suited to the past than to the changing society of the 1930s.

CHAPTER 1
HARRY BYRD: A CONSERVATIVE'S RISE TO POWER
Critics of United States Senator Harry Flood Byrd accused him of clinging to the past in an
unyielding attempt to avoid the realities of modern America. Indeed, strong ties bound Byrd's
political and economic philosophies to events that occurred in Virginia at the time of his birth.
Post-Civil War economics and early business experiences led Byrd to espouse fiscally
conservative economic principles. The involvement of his father and uncle in Virginia's
Democratic "Organization" determined, to a large extent, the path of Byrd's political career. As
Byrd's prominence within the Virginia Democratic party rose, his support of a business-minded
approach to government never wavered. From his early involvement in state government to his
lengthy tenure in the United States senate, Byrd remained committed to the conservative
ideology that he formed early in life.
Born to a historically prominent Virginia family, Byrd was aware of--but not consumed by-
his ancestors' accomplishments. One of Byrd's forebears, William Byrd I, served in the House of
Burgesses in 1677 and was named to the Royal Council. William Byrd II, also a member of the
House of Burgesses and the Royal Council, established the city of Richmond and built the
famous Westover plantation. The Byrds' standing within Virginia society disappeared when
William Ill's risky business investments and gan1bling habit depleted the family fortune. In 1786
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William's son Thomas Taylor Byrd moved to Frederick County in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley.
His son Richard Evelyn Byrd became a lawyer who served in the l 829 Virginia Constitutional
Convention, the General Assembly, and the Confederate General Corps. Richard's son, William
Byrd IV, moved to Texas where he served in the Confederate Army before returning to Virginia
with his wife and son Richard Evelyn Byrd. 1
Richard Evelyn Byrd, the father of Harry, continued the family's involvement in Virginia
politics. In 1884, after becoming a lawyer, he was elected Frederick County's Commonwealth
Attorney. In 1886 he married Eleanor Bolling Flood, whose ancestors included a United States
ambassador to France and a United States senator from West Virginia. Born a year after the
marriage of Richard and Eleanor, Hany was nan1ed after Eleanor's brother Henry "Uncle Hal"
Flood of Appomattox. Two brothers, Richard Evelyn Byrd, Jr., and Thomas Bolling Byrd, born
in l 888 and 1889 respectively, soon joined the family.2
The Byrds made their home in the small town of Winchester. Plain-spoken, practical people
with strong work ethics populated Virginia's Shenandoah Valley, and Harry Byrd was no
exception. 3 As a child, Byrd learned of the economic troubles the region experienced as a result
of the Civil War and an agricultural depression in the late 1800s. He also became aware of his
own family's financial hardships. In 1902 Richard Byrd informed his family that he planned to
stop publishing his paper, the Winchester Evening Star. Richard Byrd, although highly
intelligent, had failed at managing a business and his paper was in debt $2,500. The
fifteen-year-old Harry, not lacking in initiative, offered to quit school and take over the Evening

Star. His parents agreed and Harry Byrd entered the business world while still a teenager. 4
Byrd's experience as manager of this small town paper shaped his economic philosophy.
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His ongoing battle against debt began when he successfully rescued the Evening Star from
bankruptcy. An early example of Byrd's famed pay-as-you-go fiscal policy occurred when he
arranged to have the Antietam Paper Company deliver newsprint daily. After collecting money
owed to the paper each morning, Byrd then paid for the day's supply of newsprint. By adhering
to this policy, Byrd's paper soon became profitable. In addition, Byrd's management of the

Evening Star reinforced his belief in individualism and industry. Throughout his life Byrd
maintained that determined, hard-working individuals would prosper. Because Byrd chose to
quit school, his management of the paper also deprived him of an education that may have made
him more accepting of viewpoints other than those of a businessman. 5
While both of his brothers pursued higher education, Byrd expanded his business activities.
In 1904 he became a local manager of the Bell Telephone Company. With the money earned
from this occupation, Byrd decided to invest in the apple business. Although he began by leasing
orchards, Byrd would eventually become one of the largest apple growers in the world. In 1907
he started a profitable newspaper, the Martinsburg Evening Journal. The following year, Byrd
became president of the Valley Turnpike. As with the Evening Star, his involvement with the
Turnpike influenced Byrd's future political career. As Turnpike president, Byrd
gained more business experience and acquired valuable knowledge about the construction and
maintenance of roads. 6 Byrd's accomplishments did not go unnoticed. Aware of his nephew's
business acumen, Hal Flood remarked "Harry's got a head on his shoulders. He is a real
businessman, one of the best young businessmen in Virginia. He has determination and ability
and he's not afraid of work. That boy will be Governor of Virginia some day." 7
Byrd's success as a businessman resulted from his own talents and initiative, however he
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credited Richard Byrd and Hal Flood with exposing him to politics. In 1891 voters elected Flood
to the state Senate and ten years later, he won election to the United States House of
Representative. In 1906 voters sent Richard Byrd to the House of Delegates, where he became
speaker after only two years of service. Byrd once remarked, "Most of what I have learned
outside my own experience, I learned first from my father and my uncle. They helped me most
of all in what political knowledge I possess. "8 Both the elder Byrd and Flood belonged to the
Thomas Staples Martin's Democratic Organization. Martin rose to power in 1893, when he
defeated the favored candidate, Fitzhugh Lee, in a race for the United States Senate. He headed
the Organization until his death in 1919, when control passed to Byrd in 1922. 9
The Martin Organization's history helped determine the shape of the future Byrd machine and
also reinforced Byrd's conservative principles. Virginia's Democratic Organization formed in the
1880s during the Readjuster movement led by William Mahone. After winning the battle to
readjust the state debt, Mahone and his followers attempted to reduce the power of the wealthy.
In an alliance with blacks, this new Republican party repealed the poll tax, raised corporate taxes,
lowered real estate taxes, and supported free public schools. The Readjusters' victories came at
the expense of the Conservatives, or Funders. These wealthy bankers, speculators, and railroad
men failed in their attempt to repay in full the state's $45 million prewar debt. Although the
Funders acquiesced in their fight against repudiation of the debt, conservatives still railed against
future indebtedness. 10 Indeed, members of the Organization learned many lessons from this
period of Virginia's history. According to political reporter Charles McDowell, Byrd followers
"associated Reconstruction with an all-powerful and arbitrary government that did bad things to
people, and they associated it more than that with debt, debt, debt. ... So the government was to
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be not powerful and it was to be low taxing, and it was never to be run at a loss. That is what
really mattered." 11
In 1883 the conservatives rejected their old leadership and formed the Democratic party led by
businessman John S. Barbour. A decade later, the Democratic Organization, now under the
control of Martin, dominated Virginia politics.12 Their domination was not absolute, however.
Antimachine independents hoped to break the control of what Carter Glass called the "corrupt,
costly... office-holding clique." 13 In order to reform Virginia's political system, independents
called for a constitutional convention. Martin opposed this proposal, but Hal Flood--one of
Martin's most loyal supporters--favored a convention as a means of disenfranchising black
voters.The re-establishment of the poll tax by the 1901-02 convention reduced both the black
and white electorate. Twice as many Virginians voted in the 1900 Presidential elections as in the
1904 election.14
The Constitution of 1902 signified the arrival of a progressive movement in Virginia.
Conservatism, however, characterized Virginia's progressivism as much as reform did. The
Martin Organization's foremost concern was preserving the state's political and social stability.
The uncertainty and chaos associated with the Readjuster movement could not reoccur.
Restricting the electorate was one way to prevent another popular revolt; the closed primary was
another. The poll tax and the adoption of the primary enabled Martin to further cement his
control of Virginia politics. By bringing a sense of stability to Virginia, the Organization could
support progressivism as long as it did not jeopardize the state's traditional socio-political order. 15
Although the restricted electorate stabilized the political system, it also denied many Virginians
of a voice in government. According to Allen Moger, the Martin organization had transformed
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Virginia into "an oligarchy effectively protected from the winds of public opinion. This situation
would continue under the leadership of Senator Byrd." 16
In addition to a restricted electorate, other aspects of Virginia's political landscape combined
to strengthen the Martin Organization. Firmly in control of the General Assembly, the
Organization influenced the judicial appointments made by the legislature. These judges then
appointed local officials friendly to the Organization. The county officials, referred to as the
"courthouse rings," depended on the Organization for their power and salaries. These local
officials ensured that eligible voters in their counties would cast their ballots for Organization
men. This interwoven patronage system made it difficult for a public official to differ with the
Organization without paying a political price. 17
Indeed, the Organization expected members to support its conservative, business-friendly
philosophy. The Organization spent little time contemplating the welfare of the average
Virginian. Instead of providing social services to the people of the Commonwealth, Organization
leaders primarily addressed the needs of the business community. When Byrd took control of
the Organization after Martin's death, he relied on the small electorate and the courthouse rings
to promote his like-minded fiscal conservatism. 18
While Organization leaders agreed on most policy matters, rivalries did develop between
Martin's ambitious lieutenants. In 1910 Flood and former governor Claude Swanson vied for the
Senate seat that became available following the death of Jolm Daniel. Martin and Richard
Byrd urged Flood to yield to Swanson in order to avoid an internal fight, but Harry Byrd wanted
his uncle to receive the appointment. 19 In a letter to Flood, Byrd suggested that his own political
involvement would help his uncle's political career. Byrd also commented that Swanson's
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appointment would not satisfy Virginians because, "Many people believe he is not a big enough
man to be Senator. " 20 Despite Byrd's lobbying on behalf of his uncle, Governor William Hodges
Mann appointed Swanson to the Senate. Byrd's estimation of Swanson expressed in the letter to
Flood signaled the future rift that developed between Byrd and the new senator. 21
Harry Byrd, influenced by both his father and his uncle, entered politics in 1909 when he was
appointed to the Winchester City Council. In 1915 Byrd announced his candidacy for the state
senate. Although heavily favored to defeat his Republican opponent, Byrd campaigned tirelessly
and used the Evening Star to promote himself. His efforts paid off when the people of the tenth
district overwhelmingly voted to send Byrd to the Virginia Senate. 22 During the 1916 General
Assembly session, Byrd served on the influential senate committees of privileges and elections,
roads and internal navigation, and public institutions and education. Although Byrd would serve
in the Virginia Senate for ten years, he was never an effective lawmaker. However, he did play a
visible role in the debate concerning Virginia's road system. 23
The condition of state highways surfaced as a political issue at the turn of the century. In
1905 the Virginia Good Roads Association formed to lobby for road improvements. The
following year, the General Assembly created a the State Highway Commission and allowed
localities to issue bonds for road construction. In 1908 Virginia legislators appropriated
$250,000 for road building. 24 When Byrd ran for the state senate, he pledged to increase funding
for roads in the Valley. Indeed, at the start of the 1916 session, Byrd introduced a proposal to
reorganize the State Highway Department and give localities more control over road
construction. Byrd stated that his seven years as president of the Valley Turnpike Company had
given him the experience needed to improve Virginia's highway system. Byrd argued that the
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state had constructed expensive roads which required costly maintenance and held that counties
could construct and maintain roads suited to their area more economically than the state.25
Rejecting Byrd's plan, the Virginia Good Roads Association endorsed Highway Commissioner
George Coleman's proposal to centralize road construction in the state.26 Although the General
Assembly also rejected Byrd's suggestion, he was appointed to a commission that would develop
a state road plan.27
Commonly referred to as the "moral reform session of 1916," the General Assembly also
passed the Mapp bill which brought prohibition to Virginia. In order to rid Virginia of "demon
rum" Senator G. Walter Mapp, backed by the powerful leader of the Anti-Saloon League Bishop
James Cannon, formed an uneasy alliance with Martin's Organization. The connection to
Cannon, coupled with the United States' involvement in World War I, had a disastrous effect on
the organization. 28
When the United States entered World War I, the Organization led by Martin,
Swanson, and Flood appeared to be invincible. Wartime responsibilities, however, prevented
Virginia's congressional delegation from focusing on state politics. In 1917 both Organization
and Antimachine Democrats were preparing for the gubernatorial primary to be held in the
summer. 29 Independent Carter Glass supported the candidacy of the "dry" Attorney General John
Garland Pollard. The Organization and the Anti-Saloon League backed J. Taylor llyson, who
had voted for prohibition as a state senator but was unofficially "wet." A third candidate,
Westmoreland Davis, opposed prohibition and was not allied with the Organization or the
independents. Although Virginia was now a dry state, Davis won the Democratic primary
because he was wet. Pollard and Ellyson split the dry votes, thereby guaranteeing Davis a
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plurality. 30
As governor, Davis advocated an efficient, businesslike government. Indeed, when Byrd
became governor he echoed Davis's desire to simplify and centralize Virginia's government.31
Davis's major accomplishment as governor included passage of an executive budget, prison
reform, and creation of a central purchasing agency. Virginians approved of the governor's
leadership and for a brief period of time, it seemed as if Davis had discovered a way to dismantle
the Organization.32
After its defeat in the 1917 Democratic primary, the Martin Organization found it difficult to
regain its former influence and stature. When Senator Martin died in 1919, the leaderless
Organization was more vulnerable than ever. Davis saw Martin's death as an opportunity to
bolster his power and forever end the Organization's domination of Virginia politics. To
accomplish this goal, Davis named Carter Glass to Martin's vacant senate seat. By appointing
the independent Democrat, Davis hoped to rid himself of a possible rival, while also gaining
Glass's support for his planned challenge to Swanson's senate seat.33
Within the Martin Organization, R.E. Byrd quickly recognized the threat posed by Davis. In a
letter to an ailing Martin, he expressed his concern about Davis's political calculations and the
Organization's apparent paralysis:
[Davis] is pulling every wire to build up a personal following and to control the next General
Assembly. Almost any man can walk along the road and make progress if nobody opposes
him and this is what Davis is doing. There is no systematic, or, indeed, any opposition to him
that I can see anywhere. 34
R.E. Byrd suggested that Martin, Flood, and Swanson meet "to get up some sort of an
organization to protect ourselves against the attacks of Davis." 35 To counter Davis's actions, the
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Organization decided to win the support of their opponent, Carter Glass. After nominating Glass
for the presidency in I 920, Flood and Swanson met with a receptive Glass who wrote in his
diary, Swanson "is bigger than I thought when it comes to forgiving and forgetting. Why should
not this be pleasant? It is." Six months after this meeting, Glass renounced his attacks on
Martin's "political machine."36
The battle for political supremacy in Virginia continued during the 1921 gubernatorial race.
Davis supported the antimachine candidate Henry St. George Tucker, while the Organization
backed E. Lee Trinkle. During this election, Flood, Swanson, and state Democratic chairman
Rorer James attempted to revive the Organization by recruiting youthful leaders, including Harry
Byrd. The Organization won a victory against Davis when Trinkle defeated Tucker in the
Democratic primary. Another Organization leader was lost, however, when Rorer James died
shortly after the election.37 Hal Flood replaced him as the Democratic state chairman, but he too
died shortly after accepting the position. The death of Flood, the "wheelhorse " of the
Organization, only reinforced the Organization's desperate need for effective leadership. 38
That leadership came from Harry Byrd, who succeeded his uncle as state chairman and led the
effort to reelect Senator Swanson in 1922. Swanson backed Byrd for the chairmanship and
wrote a committee member "He is a fine young man.... He is one of the best men in the State. " 39
Byrd's use of the organization machinery contributed to Swanson's victory over Davis, which a
Richmond radio station described as "unprecedented in party primary." Carter Glass, now loyal
to the Organization, applauded the new chairman as a "young man who had made a success of his
business and will make a success of the Democratic party in Virginia."40 Indeed, Davis's attempt
to dismantle the Martin machine had unintentionally resulted in an Organization led by Byrd that
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would soon become the dominating force in Virginia politics.41
In 1922 Byrd won further acclaim for his role in redeeming the Republican-controlled Ninth
Congressional District. This district in southwestern Virginia had been a stronghold for the
"Readjusters" in their dispute with the "Funders." Now controlled by the Republican C. Bascom
Slemp, the Organization planned to engineer a Democratic victory in the Ninth District. Byrd
enthusiastically supported the candidacy of George Peery, who he described as a "magnificent
fellow" and an "excellent selection." Everett Randolph Combs, the Democratic chairman of the
Ninth, and Peery successfully began a "poll tax campaign" to qualify Democratic voters in the
district. Byrd personally campaigned for Peery in the "Fighting Ninth" and made certain that
Peery had sufficient funds to defeat the Republicans. He also persuaded Governor Trinkle not to
call a special session of the General Assembly, which could have potentially divided the
Democratic party over the issue of highway bonds. Although Peery ran against the lesser known
state senator Jolm Hassinger instead of the more prominent Slemp, his victory resulted from the
Organization's effort to register voters.42 Byrd praised Combs as the "best campaign manager in
Virginia" and acknowledged that Peery's tremendous victory was due to Combs's effective
organization. 43
The Organization's redemption of the Ninth was significant for several reasons. Combs's and
Peery's campaign to qualify and register voters would be repeated by Organization candidates
throughout the state. Furthermore, the watershed victory resulted from the efforts of a new
generation of Organization leaders. Indeed, after the victory in the Ninth District, Byrd was in
control of the Organization and had formed alliances with men, such as Combs and Peery, that
would continue in the future.44 Furthermore, Byrd had overseen an election in which no
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Democratic candidates were defeated in the state.45
In 1922 the new chairman also led the fight for pay-as-you-go highway financing; although in
the past, Byrd had occasionally supported both public and personal indebtedness. His apple
business was financed through debt and he favored bond issues that had been proposed in
Winchester.46 Even as a state senator, Byrd had not always opposed financing road construction
through bonds. In 1918 the highway commission Byrd had been appointed to in 1916
recommended a bond issue to fund highway construction in Virginia.47 Byrd, however, never
enthusiastically supported bonded indebtedness. For much of the debate over the bond
issue, Byrd's attention was frequently directed elsewhere. During World War I, Byrd served as
Virginia's fuel administrator and had responsibilities aside from his duties in the senate. Indeed,
in Byrd's absence, the Senate voted to amend Virginia's constitution to allow the issuance of
bonds for highway construction.48
In 1920, however, Byrd's opposition to road construction financed through bonds grew
stronger. The condition of roads in the Valley satisfied Byrd and his constituents. They realized
that they would be forced to pay for bonds that would not benefit their region of the state. 1n the

Evening Star, Byrd argued against state debt and an expensive road construction plan.49 Byrd
was not persuaded by those who argued that an antiquated road system jeopardized Virginia's
future.The Richmond Times-Dispatch maintained that Virginia highways were twenty years
behind those in more "progressive" states. According to the editors, business would "not come if
it has to wade through mud and plow through bottomless bogs.... Not until Virginia has a
modem highway system will it come into its heritage." The editors of the paper believed that
debt often "represents an investment from which are received ever-increasing returns. To refuse
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to go into debt just because it is a debt is a foolish, short-sighted policy, which means business
stagnation and ultimate disaster."so Perhaps Byrd felt that his own experiences with the Evening

Star had taught him a different lesson.
Issues surrounding highway construction dominated the 1922 General Assembly session. An
early fight between Byrd and Goolrick over the reorganization of the highway department
resulted in a compromise that created a five-member commission supported by Byrd, but also
allowed Byrd's opponent, pro-bond George Coleman, to remain highway commissioner_s, After
the resolution of his dispute, bond supporter C. C. Vaughan, Jr., a former president of the
Virginia Good Roads Association, sponsored a bill proposing a $12 million bond issue for
highway construction. Supporters argued that a planned gasoline tax would pay for the funding
of the bonds and increased taxation would be unlikely. Governor Trinkle, who had opposed
bonds in his campaign against Tucker, surprised the pay-as-you-go forces when he announced his
support for the bond issue. He maintained that conditions in Virginia were now favorable for the
construction of a "modern highway system" and demanded that Virginians should no longer
tolerate "impassable and badly constructed roads." Senator Swanson also spoke in favor of
bonds and urged legislators to "step forward" instead of becoming pessimistic.s2 After the
Vaughan bill passed the Senate, the House amended it to allow for a public referendum on bonds
in the upcoming general election. Byrd used this opportunity to kill the $12 million bond issue
when it came before the senate again.s3
After the bond issue died in the 1922 General Assembly, bond supporters pressured Trinkle to
call a special session to provide for highway funding. Henry B. Shirley, appointed by the
governor to chair the reorganized highway department, favored a bond issue funded by a two
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cents per gallon gasoline tax. The antibond faction, led by Byrd and Southside senators Tom
Ozlin and Louis Eppes, backed a gas tax of three cents. Both sides claimed that they could
complete the road system in eight to ten years. Although opposed to the special session, Byrd
and his pay-as-you-go supporters soon yielded to Trinkle and rallied uncommitted delegates
behind their cause. 54
When the special session opened on February 28, 1923, some feared that the bond proponents
and the pay-as-you-go advocates would deadlock. Senators Vaughan and Goolrick introduced a
$50 million bond issue, while the antibond force promoted the three cent per gallon gas tax.
Byrd maintained that the pay-as-you-go plan would construct the state's highway system in seven
years without interest payments of $40 million, compared to the five year period promised by the
bond proponents. The momentum shifted in Byrd's favor when Governor Trinkle announced that
he supported the pay-as-you-go plan. Byrd, who chaired the senate Committee on Roads and
Internal Navigation, praised Trinkle's change of heart, but George Coleman, the former Highway
Commissioner and current president of the Virginia Good Roads Association, criticized Trinkle's
new position. 55
The debate between the bond supporters and the "antis" raged throughout March. The
differences between the two competing highway referendum bills made compromise appear
unlikely. The bond forces proposed a statewide referendum on the $50 million issue, while the
antis wanted voters in each legislative district to chose between the "bond issue" or the "pay-as
you-go" proposal. Although the gas tax favored by the pay-as-you-go forces passed the house
and the senate, the statewide referendum proposed by the bond faction was adopted in an
agreement by both sides. Confident that the pay-as-you-go plan would prevail even in a state
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wide vote, Senator Henry T. Wickham, a member of the antibond group, announced to the bond
forces, "We have you whipped." Other antibond leaders, like Eppes, maintained that they would
not obey the results of the November referendum if it put them at odds with their constituents
who supported pay-as-you-go funding.56
The antibond leaders did not have to worry about disregarding the will of the people. In the
months preceding the November election, Byrd organized a campaign to defeat the bond issue.
Using methods that had proven successful in the 1922 elections, he enlisted the aid of state
leaders, from the congressional to the local level, in an effort to have poll taxes paid before the
May deadline. Byrd pressured Trinkle to improve the condition of the state's roads before the
referendum and also persuaded other state officials to campaign against the bond issue.
Although rainy weather before the election worsened the condition of the roads, Virginians
defeated the bond proposal by a 127,187 to 81,220 vote. Support for bonds was limited to cities
and counties west of the Valley; while Byrd's region, the Upper Piedmont, and Southside
strongly opposed the bond issue. 57

Hamilton J.Eckenrode, a historian of the Old Virginia

school, wrote that the bond proposal failed because the poll tax had disenfranchised the
"irresponsible electorate ... always in favor of expenditure." Byrd's pay-as-you-go policy
benefitted from the voter restrictions created by the Constitution of 1902. 58 This victory and
Byrd's notable leadership during the 1922 elections solidified Byrd's control over the former
Martin Organization.
Byrd's successes since becoming the state party chairman placed him in a position to confront
any leader who questioned either his power or his principles. Trinkle, the Organization's
candidate for governor, incurred Byrd's wrath when he jeopardized the now unassailable
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pay-as-you-go philosophy. In fact, as L. Stanley Willis writes, Trinkle "served as a foil for Harry
Byrd's emerging leadership. As Byrd's political star ascended, Trinkle's declined. "59 It was
Trinkle's announcement of a surprise deficit that sparked the fight between the state senator Byrd
and the governor.
At the opening of the 1924 legislative session, Governor Trinkle explained that the state faced
a $1.8 million dollar deficit, but hoped that future revenues would sufficiently absorb the debt.
Byrd immediately criticized Trinkle's plan to appropriate money to within $50,000 of the state's
revenues. In an interview, Byrd stated, "I like Governor Trinkle personally, but I cannot approve
of his financial policy. The Governor has made no provision to remove the deficit which the
state had incurred during his administration....The first protective move I shall make will be to
provide for the elimination of this deficit." As his fellow politicians began to speculate about
Byrd's public criticism of Trinkle, the senator reaffirmed his personal regard for the governor but
continued his attacks on a financial policy that he considered to be "bad business and ...
disastrous to the State.1160
Byrd's criticism grew when Trinkle suggested that money for road construction should be
borrowed through short term loans. This proposal was a direct assault on Byrd's pay-as-you-go
policy, approved by the voters when they defeated the bond issue in the November referendum.
Opposed to Trinkle's plan, Byrd argued, "I do not think it is in accord with the financial policy
which the people of the State endorsed overwhelmingly. They defeated by a tremendous
majority the proposal that Virginia build her roads with borrowed money."61
The state press echoed Byrd's objections to the governor's policies. Both Trinkle's
unwillingness to provide for the deficit and his subsequent plan to construct roads through
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borrowed money met with disapproval. The Richmond Times-Dispatch remarked that Trinkle's
proposals "failed to be in consonance with the accepted pay-as-you-go policy" and would burden
the governor that succeeds him. Characterizing Byrd as a "sound thinker" and a "consistent
adherent of the pay-as-you-go policy," the paper stated that the senator "is eternally right in his
contention that to disregard so large a deficiency in revenue is to skate on very thin ice." The
Bristol Herald-Courier objected to Trinkle's apparent rejection of pay-as-you-go funding, after
having supported the antibond forces during the 1923 special session. 62 Byrd's attack on Trinkle
resulted in the passage of a revenue bill to absorb the deficit. Although the final legislation did
not include all of Byrd's demands, it was recognized as a victory for Byrd and his
"pay-as-you-go"policy. 63
In a matter of years, Byrd had emerged from the ranks of the state Democratic pa11y to assume
control of the leaderless Organization. As a state senator and party chairman, Byrd was noted for
his political astuteness and pay-as-you-go policy. His business experience and the traditionalism
of Virginia shaped Byrd's political and economic philosophies. By rescuing the Evening-Star
from bankruptcy, Byrd learned the value of individual initiative and the consequences of debt.
His successful involvement in private enterprise familiarized Byrd with business principles
which he would soon apply to government. Byrd's abhorrence of debt also resulted from his
knowledge of Virginia's history. Growing up in Winchester, he learned of the battle between
Mahone's Readjusters and the Funders. The Martin Organization formed as a response to the
Readjuster movement. The restricted electorate and the loyalty of the courthouse rings allowed
the Martin Organization to control state politics while safely ignoring the need of many
Virginians.
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When the independent Democrat Westmoreland Davis became governor, it appeared as if the
Organization's dominance was eroding. As one of the Organization's younger members, Harry
Byrd helped dispel these fears. He worked to engineer Swanson's defeat of Davis and oversaw
the campaign that redeemed the Ninth district from the Republicans. He also promoted an
economic philosophy that would dominate state politics well into the future. Byrd advocated
pay-as-you-go funding as the best method of constructing a state highway system. Although
bond supporters contested Byrd's plan, voters approved his pay-as-you-go policy. When
Governor Trinkle announced a surprise deficit, Byrd continued his crusade for fiscal
conservatism. State leaders realized that Byrd's victory over Trinkle and his defeat of the bond
forces that previous year, had created a politician more powerful and invulnerable than ever. In
the words of L. Stanley Willis, "Harry Byrd had seized the reins of power. " 64

CHAPTER 2
GOVERNOR BYRD: A BUSINESS PROGRESSIVE
Harry Byrd's rapid rise in Virginia politics enabled him to seek the governor's office only ten
years after running for the state senate. Although some observers feared that Byrd would be a
reactionary leader, his administration was praised for its progressive outlook. Byrd, like many
other southern leaders during the 1920s, adopted a brand of progressivism that sought to make
government economical and efficient. Byrd's own experience in private enterprise reinforced his
commitment to run state government according to business principles. As governor, Byrd
received national attention for his reorganization of state govenunent. Byrd sought to attract new
businesses and residents to Virginia with his "Program of Progress." Throughout his four years
in office, the General Assembly supported the governor's agenda. The Republican victories of
1928, however, tested Byrd's leadership of the state Democratic party. When his chosen
successor won a landslide victory in 1929, Byrd's supremacy within Virginia politics was
confirmed. Virginians credited Byrd with bringing prosperity and opportunity to the state. When
Byrd left office, he symbolized progress; however, there were limits to his type of progressivism.
Byrd's economic philosophy and his belief in limited government narrowed the reach of his
progressive programs.
According to Byrd, a conversation with Bishop Cannon during the 1924 Democratic National
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Convention compelled him to run for governor in 1925. Cannon remarked that the Anti-Saloon
League had decided to back G. Walter Mapp for governor and urged Byrd to wait four more
years. This conversation may have had some impact on Byrd's decision to run, but it was not the
deciding factor. Byrd, his father, and other advisors debated Byrd's candidacy before the
conversation with Cannon. They concluded that Byrd would best represent the Organization and
continue to restore its position within state politics. 1
On November 22, 1924, Harry Byrd officially announced his candidacy for governor. He
joined G. Walter Mapp of Accomac and C. Lee Moore of Fairfax, in the Democratic primary
race. Upon declaring his candidacy, Byrd resigned as state chairman of the Democratic party.
Byrd's formal announcement revealed his business-minded approach to governing a state. He
promised if elected to give "Virginia a progressive, efficient, and businesslike administration."
In his quest for economy in government, Byrd pledged that as a "businessman," he would balance
the state's budget. Indeed, in his announcement, Byrd described how his past experiences shaped
his political philosophy:
I have been since early youth engaged in business and in my public life I have endeavored
always to apply the lessons of my business experience to public affairs. This experience
teaches me that progress is necessary to life and health both in business and government: but
that progress must be sought along sane and practical lines, and expenditures even for
desirable objects should bear a reasonable relation to our resources and our ability to pay. 2
By stipulating that progress must be "sane and practical," Byrd reasserted his support for fiscally
conservative, pay-as-you-go policies. Furthermore, Byrd's announcement revealed his distrust in
an activist govermnent. Referring to a proposed federal child labor amendment, Byrd stated that
he opposed "any unnecessary concentration of authority in either the State government or
national government, and [believed] in home control of home affairs. "3 Indeed, Byrd's support
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limited government would be one factor that contributed to his later opposition of the New Deal.
The three-way Democratic primary race, became a two-man contest when C. Lee Moore
withdrew his candidacy in June 1925. With the Organization backing Byrd, Mapp soon won the
support of Byrd's most vocal critics. Although officially a member of the Organization, Mapp
had little influence with the leadership. Opponents of the Organization such as former state
senator C. O'Conor Goolrick and former governor Westmoreland Davis backed Mapp's
candidacy. Bishop Cannon's support of Mapp, who led the moral reform session of 1916, was
surprisingly lukewarm. Cannon did not actively campaign on Mapp's behalf and acknowledged
that Byrd would receive the votes of many "drys." 4 Indeed, the prohibition issue did not dominate
the political discussion as it had done in the past. Byrd led a youthful, renewed Organization that
was not bound by Martin's alliance with Cannon. In this election, the Anti-Saloon League had
little influence and did not publicly endorse either candidate. 5
The major issues in the race between Byrd and Mapp concerned road construction, reform of
the fee system, and tax segregation. Mapp maintained that he supported the pay-as-you-go policy,
but would not oppose bonds if they became necessary in the future. He favored the abolition of
the fee system and proposed paying officeholders a yearly salary, instead of paying a fee for
services performed in their localities. Arguing against tax segregation, Mapp supported the
creation of a state board that would equalize assessment tlu·oughout the state. 6
When he announced his candidacy, Byrd informed the public that his ten-year state senate
record detailed his positions on relevant issues. Mapp, however, addressed an open letter to
Byrd asking him to clarify his views on key matters.7 In response to the letter and his opponent's
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outlined positions, Byrd explained his views in greater detail. Byrd advocated tax segregation
that would allow localities, instead ofthe state, to tax land and personal property. To revise the
fee system, he proposed to reduce the maximum fees received by officers to the 1920 level,
which was fifty percent lower than the maximum allowed in 1925. Byrd remained committed to
his pay-as-you-go policy and favored an additional one-cent-per-gallon gas tax to hasten the
construction ofroads. Mapp criticized this proposed gas tax and stated that it proved the
infeasibility ofconstruction based solely on pay-as-you-go financing. Byrd continued to present
himselfas a business man who would create an efficient, economical, and simplified state
government. In a speech in Bedford, he compared Virginia to a large corporation, whose
governor acted as the president and citizens as the stockholders.8
The candidates' focus on the issues and an apparent absence of"machine" versus
"antimachine" factionalism earned the praise ofmany political observers. The Richmond
Times-Dispatch stated that the alignments ofthis "queer campaign" promised a more meaningful
political discourse. Indeed, Bishop Cannon and the antiorganization, "wet" Davis now backed
Mapp, a candidate who once had been allied with the Organization, while Carter Glass, a former
enemy ofthe machine, wholeheartedly endorsed Byrd. The paper remarked:
the alignment of leaders who it had been believed could never see eye to eye....and the
commingling ofthe factions [is] an encouraging sign that in the face of a common interest for
Virginia, and following a campaign ofreal education on issues rather than a blind following of
candidates, factionalism is rapidly being submerged in an honest endeavor for the common
soul.9
The fact that both Mapp and Byrd refused the charge of"machine" membership, seemed to
indicate that concern for the state's welfare, not political infighting, would characterize the
campaign.10
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Questionable tactics by both Mapp and Byrd supporters soon overshadowed the key issues of
the campaign. One incident occurred when Byrd loyalist James M. Hayes, Jr., the Virginia
Motor Vehicles Commissioner, fired two state employees who remarked that they would vote for
Mapp. Byrd did not hesitate to join Mapp's criticism of Hayes's action. Members of the
Anti-Saloon League, who unofficially supported Mapp, caused trouble for their candidate when
an anonymous circular questioning Byrd's moral character was linked to the headquarters of their
organization. Byrd condemned the circular as a "malicious, underhanded and anonymous attack
upon my character." The state press, including papers that backed Mapp, disapproved of the
personal attacks and called for a return to a clean campaign that focused on the issues. 11
The circular attacking Byrd appeared to increase supp011 for his candidacy. Local
officeholders, once loyal to the Anti-Saloon League, now supported Byrd. 12 Organization
members relayed information to Byrd about the progress of the campaign in their localities.
Indeed, the machine promoted his candidacy from the county to the state level. Assisted by his
Organization, Byrd defeated Mapp in the primary election by a vote of 107,317 to 65,579.
Mapp's support consisted largely of machine opponents and bond supporters; while the pay-as
you-go forces and the Valley citizens remained Byrd stalwarts. 13
In the general election, Byrd ran against Republican S. Harris Hoge. With the exception of
the ninth district, Democrats rarely worried about losing an election to a Republican candidate.
After his primary victory, Byrd saw no reason to campaign tirelessly since it was assumed that he
would be Virginia's next governor. Following the death of his father in October, Byrd depended
on his fellow Democrats to secure his victory. 14 Although only 8.6 percent of qualified voters
cast their ballots on election day, Byrd won by approximately 70,000 votes. Byrd defeated Hoge
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in all ten districts, including the ninth where he received twice as many votes as the Republican.
The Richmond Times-Dispatch applauded Byrd as a "statesman and a businessman of
extraordinary ability" and urged him to view his election as an opportunity to bring further
progress to the state. 15
Like many southern Democrats in the 1920s, Byrd supported "business progressivism,"
which associated progress with economy and efficiency in government. As the "New South"
experienced industrial growth and urbanization, many southerners traded in their conservative
label for one ofprogress. This brand ofprogressivism, however, departed from the more militant
movement of earlier years. Efficiency, development, and public services replaced previous goals
ofdemocracy, social justice, and corporate regulation. Industry, education, and roads, Francis B.
Simkins wrote, formed the "trinity ofSouthern progress." In every southern state except three,
however, highways received more funding than education. 16
Virginia leaders, like their counterparts across the south, focused on creating an economical
and efficient government. Davis's executive budget and Trinkle's state government study
foreshadowed Byrd's "business progressive" administration. 17 Still, some questioned the new
governor's commitment to progressivism. Douglas Southall heeman, editor of the Richmond

News-Leader, wondered whether Byrd would prepare Virginia for the future by initiating a
program ofreform. Freeman warned, "Ifhe holds back and casts his lot with the conservatives,
he will be the lost leader ofdecadent cause." 18
Byrd's principles blended well with business progressivism. Byrd maintained that the role of
an efficient government was limited to five areas: education, law enforcement, road construction,
preservation ofhealth, and "care ofthe unfortunates." Byrd's economic and political philosophy
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embraced individual initiative, fiscal conservatism, and limited government.19 He believed that
business could not be separated from politics.According to Byrd, a politician needed experience
in the business world:
No man ... is qualified to assume political power until he has served a long apprenticeship to
private business and has learned its connections with public affairs. It is on the broad basis of
sound business economics that the business of the State should be conducted. What I am trying
to do here in Virginia is not a politician's job at all. I an1 simply trying to run State business
with the reasonable efficiency of a big corporation.20
Byrd delivered his inaugural address on February 1, 1926. Those in attendance saw an
unpretentious, plain-spoken man whose ruddy complexion and round face made him appear
younger than his 38 years.21 In his address, Byrd reaffirmed his support of pay-as-you-go
financing and recommended an additional one cent per gallon gas tax to fund emergency road
construction. He also repeated his pledge to reform the tax and fee systems. Above all, Byrd's
address emphasized adherence to proven business principles in order to create an efficient
government. Byrd proposed abolishing or consolidating useless offices and recommended
increasing the power of the executive through the reorganization of state government. He
maintained that concentrating power in the office of governor would allow Virginia "to operate
with the efficiency approaching a great business corporation." 22
At first glance, Byrd's desire to increase the power of the governor seemed to contradict his
belief in limited government. According to Byrd, however, more authority within the executive
branch would make government more efficient--not more active. He suggested that even with
more authority, governors would find it hard to advance their personal interests because they
could not serve consecutive terms. Byrd's inaugural address also stressed individualism. Urging
Virginians to preserve local self-govermnent, he proclaimed:
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Men of all parties are becoming apprehensive of the evil effects of the extension of govern
mental activities interfering unduly with the business of the individual and fostering a
paternalism that would have astonished and alarmed the great Virginians who marked out the
proper province of government....local self government remains a right to be guarded
jealously. There must be a limit to the surrender of power by the State to the nation."23
Even in the pre-New Deal era, Byrd feared that government sometimes overstepped its proper
bounds.
State lawmakers and the press praised Byrd's inaugural address and hoped that it indicated a
commitment to progress in Virginia. Speaker of the House of Delegates Tom Ozlin stated that
Byrd's speech revealed "a firm grasp on governmental conditions in Virginia and is distinctly
progressive in tone." The Times-Dispatch applauded the reorganization plan and hailed the
address as "intensely practical; it is such an address as a business man, thoroughly versed in
managerial affairs, might deliver prior to undertaking the reorganization of a great corporation. " 24
Byrd wasted little time in implementing his plan to make government more economical and
efficient. Immediately following his inauguration, Byrd signed a bill requiring all state
employees to work an eight-hour day. 25 During the next two days, the new governor delivered
two speeches to the General Assembly proposing tax reform and government reorganization.
Byrd proposed a tax segregation plan that allowed localities to levy personal property and real
estate taxes, thereby helping to equalize the tax rates. In an attempt to attract new businesses,
industries, and residents to Virginia, he urged lawmakers to reduce a number of taxes. To Byrd,
the power to tax was also the "power to destroy," and he maintained that taxes should only "be
levied to finance the functions imposed upon our government by the necessities of civilization. " 26
Byrd's second message to the General Assembly described his plan to increase the authority of
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the governor and consolidate state government. In his speech, Byrd criticized the numerous and
unorganized agencies in Virginia. Harry Byrd, the businessman, claimed that "the inevitable end
of a private business corporation, operating as Virginia does, through divided and conflicting
agencies would be bankruptcy."27 Byrd recommended that Virginia adopt a short ballot, in which
voters would elect only the governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general. He also
proposed allowing the governor to appoint department heads and consolidate or abolish
approximately 100 state agencies. Although one state senator characterized Byrd's plan as
"revolutionary, but sound," other states had approved similar reorganizations and Governors
Swanson and Davis had supported government reforms. Indeed, Byrd's reorganization plan
largely followed the recommendations made to the 1924 General Assembly by the commission
on simplification and economy. 28
With an unusual lack of opposition, the 1926 General Assembly passed Byrd's proposed
reforms. The legislators supported tax segregation, a gas tax increase to pay for road
construction, tax reductions on stocks, bonds, and invested capital, and a modified reform of the
fee system. The General Assembly funded a study to direct the reorganization of state
government and agreed on constitutional amendments establishing a short ballot and government
reorganization, which both the 1927 General Assembly and the voters had to approve.
Characterized as "remarkable" and "the most constructive session within memory," the
legislators passed all of Byrd's recommendations with unprecedented speed. Douglas Southall
Freeman remarked that Byrd accomplished more in tlu-ee months than other governors had in
four years.29
Byrd earned additional praise for his attacks on the gasoline and telephone companies. When
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the three-cent-per-gallon gas tax failed to adequately finance pay-as-you-go road construction,
Byrd proposed raising the gas tax by one cent. The 1926 General Assembly raised the tax
an additional half-cent to increase county funds, and gas dealers responded by adding their own
half-cent increase. 30 Byrd's call for an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission went
unanswered, but the 1928 General Assembly passed a bill allowing the governor to publicize
wholesale and retail gas prices. Byrd also opposed a state law that allowed the Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Company to increase rates while awaiting the decision of an appellate court.
Threatened with a special session that would amend the law, the telephone company ceded to
Byrd and agreed to the rates proposed by the State Corporation Commission. 31 Byrd believed
that businesses were responsible to the people and should not take advantage of the public. His
fight on behalf of the consumer, however, was limited to his criticism of the gas and telephone
industries. 32
Byrd's popularity among Virginians was evident during the "Good Will" tour sponsored by
the state Chamber of Commerce. For six days in May 1926 Byrd accompanied 46 businessmen
on a 1,000 mile tour of Virginia. Throughout the state, enthusiastic crowds greeted the governor
as he urged the regions to put aside their differences and cooperate for the benefit of Virginia.
Byrd spoke of the reforms that would create an economic and efficient state government and
familiarized the public with the short ballot. Many predicted that the short ballot would
encounter fierce opposition in the next session of the General Assembly. During the tour, Byrd
explained that better government--not a more powerful governor--would result from passage of
the short ballot.33
Byrd's first year as governor was an unquestioned success. In a New Year's message to
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Virginians, Byrd hesitated to take credit for the progress made during 1926. Instead, he praised
the General Assembly, citizens, and his predecessor Governor Trinkle for bringing a "new spirit
of progress" to the state. Byrd applauded the apparent end of sectionalism within Virginia and
noted that "forward-looking conservatism" was at the root of the state's recent advancements.
While Byrd refused to acknowledge his accomplishments, others praised the governor's
contributions. The Times-Dispatch wrote:
It must be said that the leadership of Governor Byrd has been the prime factor in leading
Virginia into a new day. His hold upon the affections of the people, his faculty for making
others think as one with him and his splendid dreams that could come true have been
compelling reasons for the advancement during the past year that has brought Virginia to the
attention of the country. 34
During his second year in office, Byrd turned his attention to the reorganization and
simplification of state government. Using the $25,000 appropriated by the 1926 General
Assembly, Byrd hired the New York Bureau of Municipal Research to study and recommend
changes to county and state government. He appointed a prominent Richmond businessman and
close friend William T. Reed to chair a 38 member citizens committee that would study the
bureau's report and make recommendations to the General Assembly. To head the commission
that proposed changes to the state constitution, Byrd chose Judge Robert R. Prentis of the state
Supreme Court. In January 1927, the New York bureau submitted their findings to Byrd, who
then passed the study on to the Reed committee. At the urging of the Prentis committee, Byrd
called a special session of the General Assembly to consider amendments to the constitution. 35
Although Byrd insisted that the Reed committee would not merely be a rubber stamp, he
made sure that the committee's report reflected his views. Often referred to as the "businessmen's
committee," the group headed by Reed shared Byrd's confidence in organizing government
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according to business principles.36 Byrd regularly discussed the New York Bureau's survey with
Reed, who then communicated Byrd's demands to Luther Gulick, the bureau's director.
According to Byrd, the findings of the bureau could not alienate the state lawmakers or the
courthouse rings. To further increase his influence on the committee, Byrd appointed trusted
supporters to chair the eleven subcommittees. Initially the bureau's report was only studied by
Reed and the sub-chairman, causing some members of the committee to complain about their
limited access.37
On February 12 Byrd publicized the advice of the Reed Committee. Among other things, the
citizens' committee proposed grouping government agencies into eleven departments, urged that
twenty-eight agencies be abolished, and recommended that a uniform accounting system be
established.38 The Reed committee rejected the bureau's suggestion to abolish seventy-five
offices and the positions of state treasurer and lieutenant governor. Furthermore, Byrd and Reed
refused to release the bureau's report on county government, which described local
administration as "grossly political, careless, wasteful, and thoroughly inefficient." Byrd relied
on the courthouse rings to support his Organization and he was not prepared to pay the political
price associated with reforming county government.39
The outcome of the special session mirrored Byrd's success with the 1926 General Assembly.
The House and the Senate unanimously adopted the administration's bill to reorganize state
government and the constitutional revision bill easily passed the both houses.40 The Times

Dis7Jatch stated that the uncontested passage of a measure so vital to the future of Virginia was "a
remarkable achievement." Acknowledging that government reorganization resulted in part from
Byrd's skillful leadership, the paper wrote, "Few men in our time have risen in Virginia with so
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pronounced a gift as his to mold public opinion. The degree of confidence reposed in the
Governor by the people of the State is astounding."41
Following the reorganization of government, Byrd unveiled a "Program of Progress" to
attract new industries and residents to Virginia. In his message to the 1928 General Assembly,
entitled "Virginia's Business Government," Byrd reviewed the accomplishments of his first two
years in office. According to the governor, an efficient state government and a budget surplus of
$2.6 million had given Virginia an unprecedented opportunity for economic development. The
"Program of Progress," which would bring prosperity to the state, called for tax reductions,
increased funding for state hospitals and schools, a half-cent increase of the gas tax for additional
road construction, and appropriations for Shenandoah National Park. The General Assembly
enacted these proposals and also passed an anti-lynching law favored by Byrd. Fmthermore,
state lawmakers adopted proposed amendments to the constitution for the second time. The

Times-Dispatch continued its praise of Byrd and the General Assembly, remarking that
"Business in government has never been more forcibly demonstrated." Byrd, a "great business
manager," had placed "Virginia in the forefront of progressive Commonwealths."42
After the 1928 General Assembly session, Byrd immediately launched a campaign to increase
support for the proposed constitutional an1endments. Byrd toured the state to inform voters
about the forty-seven amendments which would be voted on in an election scheduled for June 19.
Proposal One included forty-three relatively uncontroversial amendments, while Proposal Two
provided for tax segregation. The short-ballot amendments included in Proposals Tlu·ee, Four,
and Five allowed the governor to appoint the State Treasmer, the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, and the Secretary of Agricultme. Byrd maintained that defeat of the amendments
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would endanger government efficiency and Virginia's economic development. Despite the
controversial nature of some of the proposed amendments, voter apathy once again marked the
election. Although the Virginia Education Association, the Ku Klux Klan, and prominent
lawmakers from Eastern Virginia vigorously opposed the amendments, strong support in the
Valley and Southwest enabled the amendments to pass by a small margin. Adoption of Byrd's
program, including the hotly contested short ballot, led Virginius Dabney to write of the
governor, "He has achieved what a year ago appeared to be the impossible. More than ever
before he is the undisputed leader of Virginia. "43
The division of the state Democratic party during the 1928 presidential election threatened
Byrd's leadership within Virginia. The Anti-Saloon League's opposition to Democratic candidate
Al Smith caused many party members to back the Republican nominee Herbert Hoover. These
"Dry Anti-Smith Democrats" worked to defeat Smith because of his "wet record," connection to
Tammany Hall, and his selection of wet Republican John Raskob as National Democratic
Chairman. Byrd, Senators Swanson and Glass, and other members of the congressional
delegation urged their fellow Democrats to remain loyal to the party. Byrd had not supported
Smith at the national convention; however, once Smith officially became the party's nominee,
Byrd actively championed his candidacy. 44
Byrd, personally and politically "dry," defended Smith's character and argued that some
Democrats opposed Smith because he was, among other things, Catholic. The governor urged
Virginians not to place a "religious test" on office holding. He assured voters that the
Democratic party would protect prohibition no matter who won the presidency. Furthermore,
Byrd claimed that if Virginia elected a Republican, conditions associated with the Readjusters

40
would return. The governor reminded Virginians that white supremacy had resulted from
Democratic leadership. According to Byrd, Republicans had "injected the negro issue in this
campaign" and would expand the electorate and allow blacks to hold public office. 45
Byrd failed to persuade Virginians to elect Al Smith. Not since Reconstruction had Virginia
elected a Republican president. Unprepared for Hoover's victory, the loss of three congressional
seats--including one in Byrd's seventh district--added to the Democrats' shock. 46 Although the

Times-Dispatch had worried that a Republican victory would repudiate the leadership of Byrd,
Virginians voted against Smith because he was Catholic. Analyzing the Democrat's defeat, Glass
wrote, "The political parsons and innate religious prejudices were too much to overcome. "47
Byrd realized that his leadership of the Democratic party would be tested by the 1929
gubernatorial election. Byrd, constitutionally limited to one term, backed the candidacy of John
Garland Pollard, a college professor and former attorney-general who was not associated with the
Organization or the Anti-Saloon League. Swanson disagreed with the choice of Pollard, but
Byrd's decision was final. To heal the divisions within the party, anti-Smith Democrats were
allowed to vote in the August primary. Some of these Democrats refused to support the nominee
of their party. At the anti-Smith state convention, they nominated Dr. William M. Brown as an
independent candidate. Resuming their alliance with the "Hoovercrats," Republicans also chose
Brown as their nominee for the governor of Virginia. 48
The primary campaign between Pollard and his opponent G. Walter Mapp focused on the
accomplishments of the Byrd administration. While Pollard defended Byrd's record,
Mapp attacked the short ballot which he claimed gave the governor power that the people should
rightfully exercise.49 On August 6 Pollard defeated Mapp and a third candidate Rosewell Page
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by the largest margin ever in a state primary election. Judging from the Pollard's landslide
victory, Virginians endorsed Byrd's "Program of Progress" and believed Pollard would continue
in the path of his predecessor.50
In the general election, Pollard defeated the coalition candidate Brown by a staggering 70,000
votes. Although attacked by the Republicans throughout the campaign, the Byrd administration
once again received the approval of the electorate. Brown's overwhelming defeat also illustrated
the declining influence of Bishop Cannon, who had been credited with engineering the 1928
Republican victory in Virginia. Byrd maintained that national issues had not preoccupied voters
in the gubernatorial election, as they had in the presidential campaign between Hoover and
Smith. Many Democrats, including the chairman of the Democratic National Committee Jouett
Shouse, believed that victories in states like Virginia and Kentucky proved that the South would
remain a Democratic stronghold. 51
As Byrd's term in office came to a close, Virginians reflected on the numerous
accomplishments of the past four years. The Times-Dispatch, which had once feared that Byrd
was a "reactionary politician with never a progressive thought," wrote that the governor "turned
out to be the inspired leader of his people in the new era when Virginia was feeling more than
ever the urge to expand and make the most of the oppmtunities for growth which presented
themselves."52 Many applauded the progress brought to the state and noted the national
recognition Byrd's program had received. In his usual self-effacing manner, Byrd stated that his
role in Virginia's progress was greatly exaggerated. He acknowledge the former governors,
agencies, and individuals who first ushered in the "spirit of progress. "53
Under Byrd's guidance, the state government was reorganized to more closely resemble the
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corporation he compared it to. Byrd declared that the consolidation and abolition of hundreds of
bureaus and the constitutional changes accepted by the voters would make his successors the
"business head" of Virginia. 54 When Byrd left office in 1930, the state's administrative system
ranked among the best in the country. While Byrd repeatedly stressed the need for efficiency in
government, he ignored the inefficiency that characterized county government in Virginia. To
initiate a similar reorganization of county governments would have jeopardized the
Organization's support among courthouse rings. Byrd was not prepared to risk his power to
achieve the economy and efficiency that normally were among his top priorities. 55
Pay-as-you-go financing became firmly entrenched in state politics following Byrd's term as
governor. The newly amended state constitution limited the bonds that could be issued by the
legislature. Byrd claimed that the road mileage in the state increased by 45% during his
administration. He argued that motorists who used and destroyed the roads now paid for 90% of
the highways through the license and gasoline taxes. Most importantly, Virginians avoided
bonded indebtedness that Byrd believed would mortgage the future. 56 Byrd's pay-as-you-go plan
received its share of criticism, however. Critics frequently described it as a "sacred cow." No
matter how prosperous Virginia became, the constitution prohibited debt beyond I% of assessed
valuation. With Byrd in control of the state Democratic party, few challenged the
dominant pay-as-you-go mentality. 57 Other southern states that incurred debt to finance road
construction did not experience the grim future that Byrd prophesied. By 1940 North Carolina,
which issued bonds totaling $95 million during the l 920s, had a large treasury surplus,
widespread industry, and a growing population. 58
Governor Byrd took pride in the fact that he had lowered taxes and turned a budget deficit
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into a surplus. Like other politicians and the state press, he often bragged that Virginia was the
richest state between Texas and Pennsylvania. 59 However, many Virginians rarely experienced
the benefits of the state's increasing wealth. Ironically, Byrd's most ardent supporters, farmers
and rural Virginians, gained the least from his programs. During the Byrd administration, farm
tenancy in Virginia grew faster than during the Great Depression. The segregation and reduction
of taxes proposed by Byrd favored the wealthy, not the majority ofVirginians.60 Byrd
maintained that Virginia's material progress would enable the state to better educate its children,
care for the unfortunate, and preserve the health of its citizens. In a speech outlining his program
of progress, Byrd declared, "A great State, like a great individual, must have a great character,
and character cannot be either made or measured by money. I am sure we do not intend to
neglect our higher duties as strive to accomplish reforms that will make Virginia better able to
discharge those duties."61 Although Byrd claimed otherwise, social services in Virginia were
poorly funded. With the exception of North Carolina, all southern states spent more on
education than Virginia. 62
Those most in need of social services lacked a political voice. Virginia's restricted electorate
prevented likely opponents of the Byrd Organization from voting. In 1925 only 8.6% of the adult
population voted for Byrd and Pollard won only 8.1% of the potential vote in 1929. The state's
small electorate led V.O. Key to observe "Mississippi is a hotbed of democracy" compared to
Virginia.63 During the Trinkle administration, the Times-Dispatch blamed voter apathy on a
reactionary and unprogressive machine. However, even after Byrd's administration, which to
many epitomized progressive ideas, voter participation remained low. Between 1925-1945, an
average of 11.5% of eligible voters cast ballots in Democratic primaries. 64
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The progressivism that characterized Governor Byrd's administration was limited in its scope.
Byrd described his version of progress as "sane and practical" and "forward looking
conservatism." He proposed progressive ideas as long as they did not endanger his Organization
or his traditional political philosophy. "Business Prog:essivism" which emphasized economy
and efficiency complemented Byrd's principles of gClv�rning. His successes in private enterprise
taught Byrd to incorporate business management into public affairs. By reorganizing the state
government, Byrd hoped Virginia would operate like ,111 efficient corporation. Byrd guided his
reorganization and tax segregation plans through the ( ;eneral Assembly. Throughout his four
years in office, Byrd encountered little opposition front the legislators. Criticism of governent
reorganization and the proposed constitutional amendments came from opponents of the
Organization, who feared that the short ballot would give the governor excessive power. To
counter these charges, Byrd launched statewide c1111paigns to inform the voters about his
reforms.
Passage of the constitutional amendments remo\·ed any doubts about Byrd's leadership. The
state and national press praised the reforms this progressive governor brought to Virginia. Many
believed his "Program of Progress" would bring cwn :-nore prosperity and opportunity to the
state. By overwhelmingly choosing Pollard to s11ccecd Byrd as governor, voters endorsed the
accomplishments of the Byrd administration Pollan.rs landslide victory also proved that the
Republican victories of 1928 were not a re_jecticrn ul l\yrd's leadership and in 1930 Byrd left
office to widespread adulation.
Four years earlier political observers had feared that Byrd was a reactionary. Byrd's
progressive leadership quickly di pellcd these krn-s Ile surprised many who believed he was
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incapable of breaking with the past. The Times-Dispatch theorized that the responsibilities of
governing a state "wrought a metamorphosis" that transformed Byrd from a reactionary into a
progressive. 65 His association with progressivism, however, would not last long. Byrd's
methods of combating the Great Depression and his opposition to the New Deal led many to
once again characterize him as a reactionary.

CHAPTER3
SENATOR BYRD: A CONSERVATIVE IN THE AGE OF THE NEW DEAL
The Great Depression forced many Americans to modify their concept of government. The
"rugged individualism" and laissez-faire economics that characterized the 1920s gave 'way to a
growing governmental activism. The changing economic and social conditions that arose during
the depression led some to assume that government was responsible for the well-being of its
citizens. Harry Byrd was not one of these individuals. As he had done throughout his life, Byrd
preached the values of fiscal conservatism during the depression and the New Deal. Entering the
United States Senate during Franklin D. Roosevelt's first year in office, Byrd's support for
balanced budgets, pay-as-you-go financing, and economy in government never wavered.
Although initially supportive of the New Deal, Byrd was at the forefront of the conservative
opposition to Roosevelt. Once known as a progressive, critics referred to Senator Byrd as a
conservative or a reactionary who refused to adapt his beliefs to fit the changing circumstances of
a modern, industrial nation.
When Byrd left office, many Virginians predicted that the prosperity of the 1920s would
continue into the next decade. Even after the stock market crash in 1929, Byrd remarked that
Virginia was facing a "bright future" and a destiny "filled with promise." The depression did not
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initially devastate Virginia's economy as it had in other, more unfortunate states. The state's
diversified economy--balanced between manufacturing, agriculture and trade--helped lessen the
effects of the depression. Unemployment and farm tenancy rates were lower in Virginia, while
home ownership was higher than the national average. Virginia farmers also fared better than
their counterparts in other states. Like the economy as a whole, Virginia agriculture was
diversified. Furthermore, only five other states had a lower percentage of farms under mortgage.
States with higher mortgage ratios endured more bank failures than Virginia. Although several
leaders claimed that Virginia was the richest state between Texas and Pennsylvania, many
individuals lived in poverty before the Great Depression. In 1929 thirty-five states had higher
per capita incomes than Virginia. When the depression hit, subsistence farmers and blacks were
already accustomed to hard times. 1
In the summer of 1930 a severe drought gripped much of the United States. In Virginia,
tobacco and cattle suffered from the absence of rain. This drought harmed Virginia's economy
more than the 1929 stock market crash. Governor John Garland Pollard dealt with this
catastrophe by appointing Harry Byrd chairman of the State Drought Relief Committee. 2 As
chairman, Byrd criticized the relief efforts of the Hoover administration and urged Congress to
appropriate funds that would employ people in road construction. He also called on the federal
government to extend credit to farmers and purchase fertilizer, seed, and feed that farmers could
buy cheaply. During the drought, Byrd acknowledged that the government should assist
individuals in times of need. In a letter to federal authorities Byrd wrote, "We of course know in
Virginia that self-help is always the best help. The individual must do mainly for himself, but in
disasters of this kind our coordinated governmental agencies may render the task of the
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served as Byrd's conduit to the state government after Byrd left office. Byrd discussed policy
matters with Reed, who then passed the former governor's ideas on to political leaders. 8
Reed shared Byrd's conservative political philosophy. To combat the depression, Reed
advocated balanced budgets and warned against deficit spending. He opposed both state and
federal relief to the unemployed. Reed, like Byrd, valued self-reliance and believed that only
charities and local governments should provide relief to those in need. As Reed studied the
depression's effects on Virginia, he told Byrd, "We must keep Virginia like she is without any
changes."9 Although the Unemployment Relief Committee's survey of jobless Virginians
concluded that 19,483 citizens were unemployed, the actual figures were much higher. The state
Commissioner of Public Welfare and the Commissioner of Labor and Industry estimated that
35,000-40,000 Virginians needed jobs. The Committee suggested that Governor Pollard
encourage voluntary cooperation between government and business, but made no
recommendations for state relief. 10
Virginia's immunity from the worst effects of the depression ended in 1932. During that year
unemployment in the state averaged 100,000. Farm income, wages, and manufacturing
continued their downward spiral. The state economy would not begin to rebound until 1935;
however, this was still a quicker recovery than in many other states. Following Byrd's path,
Pollard urged the 1932 General Assembly to prevent a budget deficit by curtailing expenses and
avoiding tax increases. 11 He also proposed reducing all state salaries, including the governor's,
by ten percent. Byrd approved of Pollard's commitment to balanced budgets and fiscal
conservatism. Byrd desired that "Virginia maintain her present position of freedom from bonded
indebtedness, freedom of deficit and without the need of increasing taxes." However, others
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criticized the governor's disregard of the public schools. Due to tax segregation, real estate taxes
now financed local school systems. As land values dropped during the depression, local
governments found it difficult to fund schools.12
Byrd opposed any diversion of state funds to public schools since the transferred funds would
come from money reserved for highway construction. Rural Virginians, however, demanded tax
reductions. Former Lieutenant-Governor Junius West pressed Byrd to suggest a plan for local
tax relief. West believed that the state could help finance schools and also reduce the local tax
burden if automobile license taxes were diverted to localities. Byrd argued that any diversion of
the automobile license taxes would endanger pay-as-you-go financing. He maintained that his
pay-as-you-go plan had enabled Virginian to weather the depression better than other states.
Indeed, Byrd believed that avoiding debt, balancing the budget, and reducing expenses were the
keys to surviving the depression.13
In response to the calls for tax relief from the counties, Byrd proposed that the state take
control of the county roads. Although the Byrd Road Act easily passed the General Assembly, it
was unpopular in the cities. Louis I.Jaffee, editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, criticized the
Byrd Plan as "Highwayolotry as a State Religion." The Byrd Plan's neglect of the cities angered
Jaffee, who argued that hospitals, schools, and colleges needed more state assistance than the
road system.14 State Republican leader Henry W. Anderson attacked Pollard for refusing to use
state funds to aid children, the elderly, and the w1employed. He asserted that:
Every modern government in the world is assuming the social responsibility of caring for the
unfortunate among its people.... The tax burdened people of Virginia are entitled to a modern
and effective state government...which is not primarily interested in the maintenance of a
political organization, but recognizes as its first duty the necessity for meeting the needs of the
people under modern social and economic conditions.
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After failing to persuade Pollard to use gas taxes for relief, Anderson commented, "the people
cannot eat roads or be clothed in our modern god of concrete." 15
As Byrd continued to influence policy on the state level, he also contemplated a run for the
presidency of the United States. Although Byrd hesitated to enter the presidential race, Reed
strongly urged his friend to run, opening the Byrd-for-President publicity office in Richmond.
The General Assembly and the Virginia congressional delegation endorsed the candidacy of
Harry Byrd.16 While Byrd's campaign gathered momentum in the months leading up to the
national convention, Franklin Roosevelt remained the front-runner. Byrd hoped that a deadlock
between Roosevelt and Al Smith would allow him to emerge as a possible compromise
candidate.17 As he campaigned, Byrd wondered if he should adopt a more progressive stance.
Reed assured Byrd that his progressive record as governor was sufficient and warned against
further government encroachment on business.18
At the Chicago Democratic convention, Carter Glass nominated Byrd for the Harry Byrd for
president. Glass described Byrd as the "best beloved Governor that Virginia has honored in
three-quarters of a century." He summarized Byrd's past accomplislunents and promised the
delegates:
What Byrd did for Virginia he would do for the country....A confirmed expert on business
methods, tested in the problems of public taxation, he would inaugurate at Washington a wise
and provident and honest pay-as-you-go administration....from which the entire nation
would derive the blessings of a better hope and the contentment of permanent recovery.19
Byrd's favorite son candidacy ended after three ballots. When John Nance Gamer released his
delegates from California and his home state of Texas, Roosevelt won the nomination. Byrd then
threw his support to Roosevelt by releasing the Virginia delegates.20
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As the presidential election approached, Byrd campaigned for the Democratic ticket. When
Roosevelt visited Richmond in late October Byrd, Pollard, and Swanson each proclaimed him
"the next president of the United States." Byrd felt certain that Virginians would elect Roosevelt
by a margin of at least 100,000. The press and politicians speculated that Roosevelt would offer
Byrd a position in his cabinet. Rumored to be a candidate for Treasury, Agriculture, or
Commerce Secretary, Byrd refused to comment on whether or not he would accept an offer to
join the Roosevelt Administration. 21
On election day, Byrd's prediction proved correct as Roosevelt defeated Hoover by a 107,000
vote margin in Virginia. Roosevelt's victory worsened the already tense relationship between
Byrd and Swanson. As Byrd became the acknowledged leader of the Virginia Democratic party,
a rivalry had developed between Byrd and Swanson. Swanson feared a possible challenge to his
senate seat from Byrd and his lukewarm support for Byrd's presidential candidacy disturbed both
Reed and Byrd.22
The Swanson/Byrd rivalry developed into a public feud when Byrd prevented Swanson's
appointment of Norman Hamilton as Collector of Customs for Hampton Roads. Hamilton,
through his newspaper the Portsmouth Star, had criticized Byrd since his term as governor.
Realizing that he could not successfully compete with Byrd any longer, Swanson accepted
President-elect Roosevelt's offer to serve as his Secretary of the Navy. Roosevelt had originally
offered the treasury post to Glass, but he declined citing his poor health. Glass had actually
refused the offer because he differed with Roosevelt on many issues and wanted Byrd to serve in
the senate. With Swanson now in the cabinet, Governor Pollard appointed Byrd to the empty
senate seat. Swanson did not leave office submissively, however. His refusal to resign early
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denied Byrd seniority over fifteen newly elected senators. Although denied seniority, Byrd won
seats on three powerful committees: Finance, Rules, and Naval Affairs.23
Byrd and Roosevelt entered office at a time of great national unrest. In his inaugural address,
the President stated that he might ask for autocratic powers to implement the "new deal" he had
promised Americans. "In the event that the national emergency is still critical," Roosevelt said "I
shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress
for .. . broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency as great as the power that
would be given to me if we were, in fact, invaded by a foreign foe." The Richmond Times
Dispatch, citing the unprecedented economic distress, supported Roosevelt's call for increased
power and hoped that his inauguration marked the beginning of economic recovery. Byrd also
approved of Roosevelt's course of action. The Times-Dispatch wrote that he "stands ready to
grant the President dictatorial powers during the period of emergency. And we believe the
people of Virginia would back him on that issue.... these are no ordinary times. Undelayed
action might mean disaster."24
Roosevelt's inauguration ushered in a new philosophy of governing. Herbert Hoover's faith
in rugged individualism seemed, to the editors of the Times-Dispatch, "headed for the ash heap."
In the New York World-Telegram Harry Elmer Barnes wrote that the former president's
economic and political views were "as completely discredited as Mosaic biology or Ptolemaic
astronomy." Indeed, the policies of the New Deal repudiated 1920s individualism. Roosevelt
referred to the twenties as "a decade of debauch" and New Dealer Rexford Tugwell stated that
the era was "a decade of empty progress, devoid of contribution to a better future."25
Byrd supported Roosevelt's relief, reform, and recovery programs set in place during the
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"Hundred Days." Byrd, applauding the president's efforts to restore prosperity, stated:
No man since March 4 has labored with more or greater real thought trying to alleviate the
needs of the people and to restore something like the normal conditions than Mr.Roosevelt....
He had done many things which seem like experiments.But these extraordinary times need
extraordinary measures. He had gone a long way towards restoring the confidence of the
people, and the confidence is the foundation of everything.26
In addition to the economic emergency, Byrd supported Roosevelt for political reasons.
Opposing a popular president may have jeopardized Byrd's chances for reelection in 1934 and
his control of patronage in Virginia.27 The Congress did not object to Roosevelt's call for
increased executive authority. Indeed the 1933 congressional session willingly gave Roosevelt
the authority to combat the depression. With fourteen million citizens unemployed, Americans
demanded that their elected leaders act to end the widespread suffering. Many conservatives in
Congress reacted to their constituents' demands and this period of economic emergency by
passing legislation that they normally would have opposed.28
Byrd supported New Deal policies such as the bank holiday, the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration (AAA), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).Although Byrd voted against
the bill legalizing alcohol and objected to a licensing provision in the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA), he claimed to have supported 90% of Roosevelt's program. Carter Glass,
however, opposed Roosevelt from the first days of his administration.29 Glass directed his early
criticism of the New Deal at the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Through the
establishment of production and price controls, collective bargaining, and minimum wages and
hours, the NRA attempted to reduce unemployment and enhance the relationship between
business and labor. Arguing that the NRA harmed small industry, Glass refe1Ted to the agency's
blue eagle symbol as a "black buzzard." The power of the Byrd Organization enabled Glass to
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safely attack the New Deal, while the majority of his constituents supported Roosevelt.30
By 1934 Byrd and three other senators, Thomas Gore (OK), Millard Tydings (MD), and
Josiah Bailey (NC), had joined Glass's attacks on the Roosevelt administration. These
conservative Democrats formed the core of future opposition to the New Deal. They attacked the
growth of government spending and bureaucracy and wanted to preserve states' rights,
individualism, and legislative independence. Refusing to support Roosevelt out of partisan
loyalty, Glass wrote to Byrd, "if Virginia wants two rubber stamps in the Senate it would be
better not to select us. I would rather be remembered, if at all, for intellectual integrity than for
party subservience." Throughout the course of the New Deal, Glass voted against 81 % of
Roosevelt's proposals, while Byrd opposed the administration 65% of the time.31
Other conservative, southern Democrats supported Roosevelt in the early years of the New
Deal. Like Byrd, these men ad_vocated balanced budgets and low government spending. They
backed Roosevelt's programs for varied reasons. Patriotism, patronage, loyalty to the
Democratic party, and desire for federal aid helped ensure southern support for the New Deal.
Furthermore, many southerners held important leadership positions in Congress. In the Senate,
Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas served as majority leader. South Carolinian James F. Byrnes
acted as Roosevelt's liaison in the Senate, while Pat Harrison of Mississippi chaired the Senate
Finance Committee. 32
Byrd did not publicly oppose the New Deal until 1934, when he criticized Secretary of
Agriculture Henry Wallace's proposed amendments to the AAA. The AAA, operating under the
secretary's domestic allotment plan, sought to reduce agricultural production and increase
purchasing power through payments to farmers who cooperated with production controls. The
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majority of Virginia farmers supported the AAA and agreed to limit production of their crops. In
1934 and 1935 the AAA helped increase cash income, prices of farm products, and crop value.33
In the senate Byrd led the effort to defeat Wallace's efforts to increase the licensing power of
the AAA. Byrd claimed that the proposed amendments to the AAA would create a "Hitler of
American Agriculture." Byrd argued that the amendments and the growing bureaucracy in
Washington destroyed individual initiative and freedom over personal and business affairs. He
also opposed the nomination of Rexford Tugwell as undersecretary of agriculture. Tugwell' s
support of the proposed amendments caused Byrd to question the nominee's commitment to the
"fundamental principles of the United States government."34
As Byrd quizzed Tugwell on his loyalty to the Constitution, a University of Richmond
historian concluded that the senator's stance marked a departure from his policies as governor.
Dr. S.C. Mitchell believed Byrd's attack on a member of Roosevelt's "brain-trust" was
inconsistent with Byrd's appointment of experts to his own cabinet. Despite Byrd's opposition,
the committee and the senate confirmed Tugwell. The Times-Dispatch did not doubt the
senator's sincerity, but noted that "the American public does not take seriously the 'menace' of
the 'Brain Trusters. '"35
In 1935 Byrd renewed his attacks on additional AAA an1endments, which he believed would
gave the secretary excessive authority to license nonbasic farm commodities. He argued that the
new amendments departed from the AAA' s original goal of balancing production of basic
commodities such as com, cotton, wheat, and hogs. In a radio address, Byrd spoke as a "farmer
to other farmers" and stated the amendment would bring "chaos and confusion" to American
farmers. Byrd criticized the AAA as "bureaucracy gone mad" and remarked that the growth of
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federal agencies was "a dangerous invasion of the individual." Byrd could not understand how
such policies would revive the economy. Believing that only a balanced budget would restore
prosperity, Byrd maintained "The way to permanent prosperity is the difficult path of economy
and efficiency in government."36
The Supreme Court's ruling that declared the NRA unconstitutional bolstered Byrd's attack
on the AAA. He introduced a provision preventing licensing of a commodity until 75% of its
producers had consented. Byrd also succeeded in removing fruits and vegetables from the
licensing provisions and won concessions on price-fixing. After his amendments passed, Byrd
and Glass voted in favor of the new AAA bill.37
After opposing the Roosevelt administration, Byrd was regarded as a voice for conservative
Democrats and principles. He claimed, however, that he was unfairly characterized as an
opponent of the president. Byrd noted that he had supported the original AAA and had only
voted against the administration on the Tugwell's nomination, the AAA amendments, and the St.
Lawrence Waterway. 38 Although Byrd denied that he would join a anti-Roosevelt bloc, political
observer Elliott Thurston listed him, along with Glass, Gore, Bailey, and Tydings, as a member
of a group that had "been out of sympathy with and deeply concerned over the New Deal's steady
drift away from traditional basic principles of the Democratic party." Support from state
Republicans, who praised his "safe conservativism," embarrassed Byrd and drew criticism from
Democratic rivals like Norman Hamilton.39
Rumors of the anti-Roosevelt bloc coincided with the 1934 elections. Thurston remarked that
in this election party labels had been overshadowed by opposition to or support for the New
Deal. The Times-Dispatch concluded that the president had little to fear from the administration
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opponents because he had the approval of the"average citizen" and the"forgotten man." In the
November elections, voters gave Roosevelt a mandate to continue the New Deal. Democratic
National Chairman James Farley, predicting the Democratic victories, said"A Roosevelt tide is
running full in this country that will not be denied." Virginians contributed to the Democratic
landslide by reelecting Byrd and nine congressmen. Although Byrd had opposed the AAA
amendments and Tugwell's nomination he received 80% of the vote. Responding to "Byrd's
remarkable victory," the Times-Dispatch wrote"His occasional irregularity has strengthened,
rather than weakened him. He stands today as the undisputed political leader of his State." 40
After his reelection, Byrd's connection to Roosevelt's opponents grew even stronger. Time
described Byrd as one of the"Democrats who have not been inspired by the New Deal
philosophy." Support for the New Deal came from bipartisan progressives and party loyalists.
While some Democrats privately disagreed with some aspects of the New Deal, they supported
the president out of allegiance to the party label. The New Deal coalition was shaky, however.
Time noted "at heart the biggest bloc of Democrats still prefers states' rights to centralization of
power."41
Despite the Democratic victories of 1934, conservative opposition to the New Deal increased.
In l 935 conservatives opposed Roosevelt's attempts to reduce excessive concentrations of wealth
and the power of big business. Whereas the"first" New Deal relied on cooperation between
government, business, and agriculture, the "second" New Deal sought to protect free
competition. Conservatives and some moderates objected to the public utilities holding-company
bill, which contained a"death sentence" clause allowing the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to dissolve holding companies that did not cooperate with the SEC.
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Conservatives and moderates also opposed the administration's "wealth tax." Pressured by
leftist critic Huey Long's "Share the Wealth" plan, Roosevelt proposed taxing large

concentrations of capital. Although odifl d b th bills passed and the president claimed
another v· ct ry 'or the New Deal; however, there were signs that the New Deal
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more opposition in the future. As the memories of the emergen y of 19 3 and the ''Hundr d
Days" passed, many congressmen return to their original, conservative form.
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With the exception of the "Hundred Days," Byrd had clung to his belief in fiscal conservatism
and limited government. Although Byrd supported states' rights, Virginia leaders did little to aid
those in need. When the Governor George C. Peery entered office in January 1934, he called for
"thrift and economy" in government to restore prosperity and continued the conservative
economic policies of Byrd and Pollard. Like his predecessors, Peery opposed extensive funding
for direct relief. 43
The governor and Byrd soon became well-known critics of the Federal Emergency Reli· f
Administration (FERA). Led by Harry Hopkins, FERA distributed relief funds to feed, cloth,
shelter, and employ the needy.44 Matching funds were to be appropriated by the states. Virginia,
however, refused to contribute money for relief. Hopkins threatened to reduce or terminate funds
if Virginia did not participate in the program. Byrd and Peery believed that relief spending
would destroy state finances and individual initiative. Following Byrd's example, Peery fought
the depression by balancing the budget and maintaining low tax rates.45
The Organization justified their lack of participation in FERA with several arguments. They
claimed that Virginia was the seventh largest federal taxpayer and should receive that amount
back through relief funds. Peery, Byrd, and Glass maintained that highway construction served
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as a sufficient form of relief. Finally, they argued that participation in FERA was unnecessary
because Virginia had a low relief load. 46
A study conducted by Times-Dispatch reporter Cabell Phillips disproved many of the
Organization's arguments. Phillips agreed that Virginia had a smaller relief load than other
states; however, it was more difficult for those in need to get on Virginia's relief rolls.
Furthermore, Virginia's low debt enabled the state to contribute to relief efforts more easily than
neighboring states with larger debts. Although beneficial, highway work was limited to specific
areas and did not benefit the urban unemployed. Phillips found that both Maryland and West
Virginia--states with smaller populations and larger debts--contributed more to their highway
programs than Virginia. Because leaders refused to appropriate funds for relief, FERA
allocations to Virginia were half the amount received in neighboring states. 47
After meeting with Peery, Byrd, and Highway Commissioner Henry G. Shirley, Hopkins
backed away from his threats to withdraw federal aid to Virginia. The Times-Dispatch objected
to Hopkins's apparent acceptance of relief through the highway program, but the paper directed
their harshest criticism at the governor and the junior senator:
If they were desirous of arranging for State participation in the program of relief, it is virtually
certain that they would do so. But they are determined not to spend any of the State's money
for the State's neediest unemployed. They. are great advocates of State rights when such
advocacy meets their convenience, but when it doesn't, they believe in letting Uncle Sam hold
the bag. 48
The Byrd Organization's "ultraconservative" opposition to FERA was also criticized by the
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. When the program was phased out in 1935, the federal government had
funded $26,302,851 for relief in Virginia; the state only contributed $34,452. Although state
leaders were not enthusiastic supporters of FERA, William A. Smith, the head of the Virginia
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Emergency Relief Administration (VERA), was an able dispenser of federal funds. Smith
favored work relief and its associated "economic and moral values" over the dole. FERA
assisted at least 375,000 to 500,000 Virginians, many of whom helped improve schools, airports,
parks, and streets.49
Byrd's fiscal conservatism was the major reason he assailed the Works Progress
Administration (WP A), which attempted to provide employment for the individuals on relief
rolls.50 Byrd proposed an amendment reducing the $4,880,000,000 work bill to $1,800,000,000.
In a senate speech, Byrd argued that the crisis of 1933 and the "Hundred Days" had ended. He
stated the businessmen now needed their property protected from "destructive taxation." Byrd
claimed that the administration's deficit spending would only worsen the recovering economy.
He asserted that "increasing our enormous deficit each year will chill the confidence of business
men .. . . The people must be encouraged to go the way of independence, industry, economy, and
self-reliance." In an interview with the press, Byrd stated that the current public works projects
would soon be valueless and would mortgage "the future welfare of our children, grandchildren,
and even generations to come." Byrd resolved to "reduce the spending orgy at Washington." 51
On March 19, 1935, Byrd lost his battle to reduce funding of the work bill when the Senate
defeated his proposed amendments. After his loss, Byrd warned that passage of the bill would
result in "unbearable" debt and rising taxes. He doubted that the administration could provide
work for the 3.5 million individuals on relief rolls. Although Byrd and Glass opposed the $4
billion work bill, it passed the Senate by a 68-16 vote. The WPA, limited in size and cost,
employed the needy in a diverse array of projects. Virginians constructed public buildings,
sewers, and gardens. Writers, artists, and musicians also found employment through the WPA.52
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Byrd's opposition to the New Deal strengthened as he fought Roosevelt's social security
legislation. Byrd maintained that the Wagner pension bill would increase Virginia's tax burden
by 130%. He also argued that the measure would give excessive power to federal officials.
Byrd acknowledged that, during times of emergency, the executive branch needed extra power to
govern. He feared that the power given to the government by the pension system would become
permanent. Byrd pledged never to vote, "to concentrate power in Washington in the hands of an
appointive official. ..and thereby destroy the last remnants of the rights of the States." Backing
Byrd, Governor Peery maintained that Virginia would not adopt pension system for the elderly
even if Congress passed a social security law. 53
In two editorials, the Times-Dispatch attacked Peery and Byrd for their opposition to a social
security program. The paper questioned Byrd's assertion that a pension system would cause the
state tax rates to skyrocket and argued that 28 other states already had implemented old-age
pension systems. The editors took issue with the senator's fear of concentrated power in
Washington, "it is much better to allow the Federal Government to exercise general supervision
over the system so as to insure decent standards and adequate uniformity, than to allow each state
to develop its own plan in haphazard fashion."54 The Times-Dispatch was troubled over Byrd 's
and Peery's reluctance to acknowledge the necessity and desirability of a social security system:
Both Mr. Byrd and Mr. Peery seem to be living in the nineteenth century era of laissez.faire,
when anybody who advanced the idea that governments were socially responsible for their
citizens was regarded as a radical or a crank.... The time has come for the political leaders in
the State to wake up to the fact that they are not living in a bygone era. The national
government and many of the State governments are leaving Virginia behind.55
The editors criticized the Organization's reliance on highway work to provide relief, "State
leaders seem to feel that roads are the all-important desideratwn, and that everything else should
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be subordinated to them. A stretch of highway is not a particularly comfortable place for a
jobless man to lay his head ... nor is it of any material assistance to a destitute citizen 65 years
and over. " 56
Byrd immediately responded to the accusations made in the two editorials. In a statement on
old age pensions, he claimed that he never opposed a "reasonable plan" for individual economic
security. Byrd pledged that he would support appropriations to feed and clothe the needy, but
would oppose a pension system that "will mean our disaster." Byrd believed the proposed social
security system would put the nation in debt, "I realize that the American people have been
educated to believe that there is a Santa Claus in Washington with an inexhaustible supply of
money, but some day the money we are now borrowing will have to be paid back." 57
Byrd's approval of a "reasonable" social security plan reassured the Times-Dispatch. The
paper, however, believed the pension system would cost less than the figures publicized by Byrd.
Both Byrd and Peery maintained that the Wagner pension bill would cost Virginia at least $10-12
million per year. The Times-Dispatch and the Virginian-Pilot concluded that the state would
have to pay only $2.6 million each year, while federal officials estimated a cost of $1.26 million.
Despite opposition from Byrd and Glass, Roosevelt's old age pension plan passed the Senate by a
76 to 6 vote.58
During the 1936 General Assembly session, Peery moved towards adoption of a social
security system. The governor recommended that the state adopt an unemployment insurance
system so Virginia did not lose federal funding. Because he and Byrd still feared that a pension
plan would jeopardized Virginia's low taxes and balanced budgets, Peery proposed a study that
would delay old-age pensions for two years. Although the General Assembly increased funding

64
for schools, roads, and direct relief, the legislators defeated the unemployment insurance plan.
Those who supported social security legislation characterized the 1936 Assembly as the most
"reactionary" since 1920. After other states adopted the unemployment insurance plan required
by the federal government, Peery called a special session which passed the legislation. 59
In response to the Organization's opposition to social security legislation, some Virginians
began criticizing state leaders. When the General Assembly refused to implement a social
security plan Westmoreland Davis, whose Southern Planter favored old-age pensions, wrote
"The explanation for Virginia's lag lies not in a lack of need for her aged, but in a lack of interest
of a machine-controlled legislature in matters of human welfare."60 The Virginia Federation of
Labor, supporting both relief appropriations and social security legislation, condemned Byrd and
Glass for the unfair and umeasonable opposition to the New Deal. In the 1935 state elections,
the Organization suffered losses as Anti-Organization candidates, Republicans, and Independents
won races. Judging from the election results, the Times-Dispatch concluded "that the
Democratic organization no longer has the grip it enjoyed a year or two ago."61
Despite criticism from the press and opponents of the Organization, Byrd refused to depart
from his fiscally conservative policies. In a speech entitled "The Relationship between Sound
and Progressive Government and the Progress of a State," Byrd credited conservative policy with
reviving Virginia's economy. He asserted that lower taxes, reduced debt, and balanced budgets
had enabled the state to recover from the depression faster than other states. Byrd predicted "an
era of prosperity" if leaders continued to follow sound economic policies. Byrd applauded the
"courageous actions of Governors Pollard and Peery" and defended the Organization's
conservatism:
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From time to time we hear proposals made that the conservative fiscal policy of Virginia is too
rigid. Let us remember that a debt once created must be paid.... Some are inclined to belittle
the importance of a sound budget and to any Virginia is 'old fashioned' but our future progress
will be more permanent if we build upon the solid foundation of 'pay-as-you-go.'62
During 1936 Byrd began urging the federal government to economize by reducing spending.
The Times-Dispatch agreed that government spending could not continue at its present rate. The
editors, however, feared that Byrd's version of economy would be harmful, "Unless we are
misinformed, Mr. Byrd is convinced that the majority of those on relief are chiselers who ought
not to be there, and certainly he has been strongly antipathetic to most proposals embodying
plans for social security."63
In 1937 Byrd, as the chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Reorganization,
concluded that consolidation and abolition of agencies and coordination of activities would result
in reduced deficits and economy in government. The previous year, Byrd had dedicated himself
"to a drastic reorganization and simplification of the Federal Government " which he hoped
would lead to the adoption of pay-as-you-go spending. Ignoring Byrd's demands, Roosevelt's
own reorganization plan emphasized efficiency, rather than economy. 64
In an address at the University of Richmond, Byrd outlined his proposals to bring economy
and efficiency to the federal government. He criticized the bureaucracy and concentrated power
that existed in Washington. Byrd referred to the numerous govenm1ent agencies as
"Frankensteins--the contrivances of ingenious idealistic theorists--that may grow so powerful as
to destroy the rights of citizens to liberty, life, and the pursuit of happiness." He regretted the
continuation of deficits after the passing of the economic crisis and lan1ented the gradual
disappearance of states' rights. In order to restore permanent prosperity, Byrd urged the federal
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government to adopt Virginia's conservative pay-as-you-go policy. The senator also affirmed the
validity of the "old principle" of individualism. According to Byrd, "independence, industry,
economy, and self-reliance remain the only certain pathway to success and individual
development. "65
In 193 7 conservative opposition to Roosevelt intensified when the president announced a
surprise plan to "pack" the Supreme Court. After winning a landslide victory in the 1936
presidential election, Roosevelt wanted to ensure that the Supreme Court would uphold future
New Deal legislation. The justices had declared the NRA, the AAA, the Guffy Coal
Conservation Act, and a New York state minimum wage law unconstitutional. Roosevelt,
disguising his attempt to appoint liberal New Dealers to the court, claimed that the federal
judiciary was overworked and aged. The president called on Congress to grant him the right to
appoint up to six new justices for in�urnbents over the age of 70 who refused resignation. 66
Conservative and moderate Democrats, Republicans, and disaffected Progressives blocked
passage of the proposal. Southern Democrats opposed the plan because they feared it would
jeopardize race relations in their region. In the 1934 and 1936 elections, blacks had deserted the
"party of Lincoln" for the Roosevelt-led Democrats. Southern irreconcilables like Glass and
Bailey attacked the president's alliance with northern, urban blacks. In a radio speech criticizing
the court plan, Glass stated that Roosevelt sought to destroy a court "that validated the suffrage
laws of the South" and saved the region "from anarchy and ruin associated with Reconstruction. 67
After the Supreme Court upheld New Deal legislation on its own initiative, Roosevelt claimed
he had lost the battle but won the war. The president, however, did not realize the extent to
which the court-packing plan had unified the conservative coalition in Congress. Not only were
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Republicans now united in their opposition to Roosevelt, but moderates who had once supported
the New Deal began drifting away from the president. Refusing to compromise had also
damaged the president's reputation. According to one magazine, the public still supported
Roosevelt after his defeat, but he had lost "the old awe, reverence, and idolatry."68
The Roosevelt coalition that formed during the New Deal also contributed to the growing
criticism of the administration. In addition to blacks, Roosevelt's supporters consisted oflabor
unions, ethnic groups, and individuals on relief. These groups were most prevalent in urban
areas of the North. In 1937 liberal congressmen began pressing for legislation that would aid
cities. Democrats representing rural areas began to abandon the New Deal, even though they had
supported the president in earlier years.69
By the summer of 1937, the bipartisan conservative coalition, unofficially led by Vice
President John Nance Garner, was attacking the administration's increasingly liberal proposals.
The "Roosevelt Recession" of 1937-38 also lessened support for the New Deal. Many
conservatives cited the recession as proofthat Roosevelt's policies had not restored prosperity.
In the midst ofthis recession, Byrd and other New Deal critics supported a conservative
manifesto that proposed a return to a balanced budget.70
As economic condition worsened in 1938, Roosevelt announced a $6.5 billion program that
would spend or lend funds for relief, public works, highways, housing, pump-priming, and
business capital. Byrd, joined by a coalition ofconservative Democrats and Republicans, called
for a return to balanced budgets and reduced spending. Denouncing pwnp-priming as a failure,
Byrd maintained that it had created a "transient and artificial prosperity." He professed "to
prevent any American suffering for the necessities oflife," Byrd stated that nine years ofreckless
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spending and rising deficits had caused the stagnation of American business. 71
Although conservative opposition to the New Deal had increased since the court-plan, the
House and the Senate passed Roosevelt's relief program. Roosevelt had suffered several defeats,
but the majority of Americans still supported the New Deal. Congressmen realized any
opposition to the president's popular relief programs would endanger their re-election bids in
November. Furthermore, the Roosevelt coalition united in support of the relief programs. Their
unwavering advocacy of the bill overshadowed what little conservative opposition existed.
According to James Patterson, "No issue so well illustrated the impermanence of the
conservative bloc." Republicans and "irreconcilable" Democrats could be counted on to oppose
the New Deal. Other Democrats wavered between support and opposition of the president.
Joseph Alsop of the Washington Star observed, "when a pro- and anti-New Deal issue is
squarely presented, a shifting population of conservative Democrats can be counted on to join the
Republicans to vote against the president. The arrangement is not formal. There is nothing
calculated about it."72
Roosevelt could still win legislative victories; however, his relationship with Congress had
worsened since the early days of the New Deal. As he had done in the court-packing
controversy, Roosevelt used heavy-handed tactics to silence New Deal critics. Through
intervention in 1938 Democratic primaries, Roosevelt attempted to pw-ge conservatives from
office. Although Byrd and Glass did not face re-election in 1938, the president collaborated with
anti-organization forces to lessen the Byrd machine's influence within the federal government. 73
The anti-organization faction was unofficially led by Governor James H. Price (1938-42).
Often disagreeing with Byrd, Price had opposed the short ballot and favored relief programs
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associated with the New Deal. The Byrd Organization, unwilling to risk a political fight,
reluctantly supported Price's gubernatorial campaign. In his inaugural address, Price stated that
he sympathized "with the present trend of government toward humanitarian ideals." As governor,
he proposed state social security legislation, increased funding for education, and a balanced
budget. Price's commitment to fiscal conservatism pleased Byrd, but he soon became
disenchanted with a governor who embraced the New Deal and appeared to threaten his
Organization. 74
Price's dismissal of E.R. Combs, chairman of the State Compensation Commission,
displeased the Organization. Through his control of local officers' salaries, Combs helped
guarantee statewide support for the Organization. Byrd and his supporters saw Combs's firing as
evidence that antiorganization forces intended to destroy their political power. Roosevelt also
helped incite the public rift between the Organization and the Virginia New Dealers. The
president had accommodated Byrd and Glass on patronage issues before 1935; however, he
became more combative as the Organization became more vulnerable. In 1936 voters elected
New Dealers Norman Hamilton and John Flannagan to the House of Representatives. Price won
election the following year. According to the Richmond News Leader, 1936 and 1937 were
"unhappy days" for the Byrd machine.75
These antiorganization victories caused Virginia liberals to demand that Roosevelt cease
giving appointments to Byrd loyalists. Roosevelt, now battling the burgeoning conservative
coalition in Congress, became certain that compromising with Byrd and Glass had to end.
Roosevelt ensured Price that he, not Byrd, would have final approval over federal appointments.
State Senator Charles J. Harkrader wrote in the Bristol Herald Courier, "For the first time since
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Mr. Roosevelt had been in the office of President, there is complete cooperation between
Richmond and Washington...76
Harkrader, Flannagan, and Hamilton flamed the patronage fire when they supported Floyd
Roberts' appointment to the federal District Court for western Virginia. Byrd and Glass wanted
either Circuit Judge A.C. Buchanan or Assistant U.S.District Attorney Frank Tavenner
appointed to the position. By disregarding their nominees, Roosevelt tried to end the senators'
domination of patronage.77 At a Senate Judiciary hearing, Glass claimed that Roberts'
nomination "was to be proposed as a rebuke for the failure of the two senators from Virginia to
vote for the measures proposed by the President." Byrd stated that the nomination "was made for
the specific purpose of being personally offensive and personally obnoxious to the senators from
Virginia." Former governors Davis and Trinkle spoke in favor of Roberts' nomination at the
hearing. Supporting the tradition of senatorial courtesy, the Senate defeated the nomination by a
72 to 9 vote. As with the court-packing plan, Roosevelt's patronage fight and purges helped to
unify conservative opposition to the New Deal. 78
In the latter years of the New Deal, Byrd continued as a voice for conservatism. The conflicts
between Byrd's economic philosophy and the administration's fiscal policies incited a public
feud between the senator and Marriner S.Eccles, the chairman of the federal reserve. In an
address to a Massachusetts taxpayers' association, Byrd called for an end to the "nine years of
fiscal insanity." In addition to suggesting that government be reorganized, Byrd stated that local
communities must assume some of the relief burden. In a letter responding to Byrd, Eccles wrote
"your program is ...a defeatist one, a program of retrogression and not of progress." Eccles
argued that the current debt that Byrd criticized actually aided the economy by providing
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employment at a time when private spending was shrinking.79
Byrd addressed this criticism in his own letter to Eccles. He asserted that pump-priming
would not create a recovery and the Roosevelt administration had repudiated the 1932 and 1936
Democratic platforms by refusing to balance the budget. Byrd claimed that prosperity would
return when business regained confidence and the individual was free from restraints.
Acknowledging that Eccles ridiculed his '"time-old virtues of thrift, frugality, self-reliance and
industry, "' Byrd refused to "agree with those who regard thrift as a vice . . . or who regard
spending for spending's sake as the highest virtue and wisdom."80
Byrd's commitment to his pay-as-you-go policies had not weakened during the New Deal.
Virginia had escaped the worst of the depression and experienced an economic upturn between
1935 and 1940. The Organization claimed that fiscal conservatism had created the state's
relative prosperity. Virginius Dabney noted, "Pay-as-you-go thenceforth became for them an
unshakable article of faith. It would endure as long as Senator Byrd lived."81
As long as Byrd remained in control of the state Democratic party, fiscal conservatism would
be valued over public welfare. Critics admitted that Virginia had an efficient and honest
government, but argued that the Byrd Organization served the "haves" instead of the
"have-nots."82 V.O. Key also acknowledged that the Organization gave Virginians "good
government," but wrote that state leaders possessed an "adding machine mentality" and placed
priority on balanced budgets instead of the long-term goals. Key concluded that "Men with
minds of tradesmen of do not become statesmen." 83
Many Virginians who differed with the policies of the Byrd Organization did not participate
in politics. The Organization continued to rely on the poll tax, which assured low voter turnouts.
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Assuming that the Organization was unbeatable, some voters felt their vote was worthless while
others believed that only their "betters" should participate in elections.84 Support from the
"courthouse rings" also assured the Organization of power. The State Compensation Board,
referred to as the "heart and soul of the Byrd machine," further increased the power of the
Organization. 85
Byrd's opponents often charged that his Organization was backward. They pointed to state's
reluctance to fund social services when it had adequate finances to do so. Charles McDowell
stated that the Organization assumed "that the state owed its citizens very little in the way of
services. There was an assumption that their job was mostly to be terribly honest, good
accountants, pay-as-you-go, build good roads, and keep it clean."86
Some of Byrd's critics praised his leadership as governor, but noted that he had "stopped
growing" after he entered the Senate. To them, Byrd failed to understand how the depression
affected the unfortunate. During the New Deal he began, what one critic termed, an "obsession
with economy in government." As the New Deal drew to a close and the United States entered
World War II, Harry Byrd remained "the watchdog of the Treasury." With prosperity restored
after the war, Byrd continued to fight against increased spending for social services. 87
Hailed as a progressive governor during the 1920s, Byrd soon became linked with
conservatism and reaction. The New Deal ushered in a new philosophy of governing that Byrd
was unwilling to accept. He believed that principles of fiscal conservatism would restore the
prosperity that had been lost during the Great Depression. To the Byrd Organization, Virginia's
relatively healthy economy proved that pay-as-you-go financing worked. Byrd's proposals to
revive the economy differed from the programs of the Roosevelt administration. Although he
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had supported the president during the economic emergency of the "Hundred days," Byrd soon
publicly opposed the New Deal. He believed that expensive, bureaucratic policies of the
Roosevelt administration jeopardized individualism and balanced budgets. Byrd was not alone
in his opposition to the New Deal. During the mid-thirties, criticism of the Roosevelt increased.
Roosevelt's attempts to silence conservative opposition to the New Deal only helped to unify the
conservative coalition.
Few members of this "coalition" were as conservative as Byrd. He had consistently opposed
the New Deal since 1934 and led an Organization that preserved his fiscally conservative
principles in Virginia. The state press and his political opponents criticized the Organization's
reluctance to participate in relief or social security programs. Byrd would not endanger pay-as
you-go funding and the state's balanced budget, which he believed would ultimately restore
prosperity. As the nation began to accept a more powerful federal government, Byrd remained
committed to an economic philosophy that he formed early in life. Entering the senate during a
time of economic crisis, Byrd was limited by his unbending allegiance to fiscally conservative
principles. When he retired from the senate in 1965, his opposition to the New Deal was judged
to be one of Byrd's greatest failures. As the Washington Post wrote, "His name would loom
much larger in the annals of our time if he had been leading the way to the future instead of
looking backward to the past. "88

CHAPTER4
CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF HARRY FLOOD BYRD
The New Deal did not end the Great Depression, but it did usher in a new era in American
governmental philosophy. It took World War II to restore the prosperity that the nation had been
trying to regain since the early thirties. Nevertheless, the modern welfare system had its origins
in the policies of the Roosevelt administration. Rejecting old concepts of laissez.faire
economics, the federal government began large-scale intervention in the economy. A powerful
coalition of minorities, labor, urbanites, and farmers formed within the Democratic party and
would serve as its core for decades to come. Indeed, even though the New Deal failed to revive
the economy, it did change the role of the federal government.
Because of Harry Byrd's background and experiences, he fought this turning point in
American history. The Great Depression had caused unprecedented economic distress that
individuals, localities, and private agencies were unable to alleviate. Under Franklin Roosevelt's
leadership, the federal government assumed the responsibility of assisting the needy and HWiving
the national economy. Byrd opposed the growing activism of the federal govenunent and the
New Deal's approach to combating the depression. He maintained that govenunent should be
limited and economical. According to Byrd, only a steadfast adherence to fiscally conservative
policies would restore economic prosperity.
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While others modified their economic and political philosophies during the New Deal, Byrd
never disavowed the conservative principles that he formed early in life.

Byrd's experiences

with the Evening Star and his successful career in private enterprise taught him the dangers of
debt and the value of business principles and initiative. The conservativism of the Democratic
Organization, which he would later control, reinforced his economic and political philosophy.
Byrd quickly rose through the ranks of the Martin Organization. He helped defeat
antimachine Democrats like Westmoreland Davis and guided the Organization to victories when
his leadership was needed the most. Byrd also began his lifelong association with pay-as-you-go
funding. Byrd killed the bond issue in the 1922 General Assembly and successfully organized a
campaign to defeat a bond proposal in the 1923 referendum. When Governor Trinkle announced
a surprise deficit and suggested borrowing money for road construction, Byrd fought to preserve
his pay-as-you-go policy. Byrd's victories, in addition to tying Virginia to his pay-as-you-go
plan, increased his political power and enabled him to assume control over the former Martin
Organization.
Only a decade after entering the state senate, Byrd became governor of Virginia. Before Byrd
entered office, many characterized him as a "reactionary;" however, he quickly became
associated with progressivism. The progressivism that Byrd displayed never endangered his
political Organization or Virginia's traditional society. Progress, to Byrd, should be "sane and
practical." As a "business progressive," Byrd concentrated on encouraging development and
creating an economical, efficient government. Indeed, Byrd often spoke of modeling state
government on proven business principles. He frequently compared Virginia to a business
corporation and spoke of the governor as its president and the citizens as the corporation's
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stockholders. Byrd believed that his business experiences qualified him to serve in public office.
He promised Virginians that he would adapt the lessons he learned in the private sector to the
state government.
These principles guided Byrd as governor of Virginia. In his first days as governor, he
proposed plans to reorganize state government and reform the tax system. The 1926 General
Assembly passed his tax segregation plan and agreed to a study that would guide the
reorganization process. Byrd's close friend William Reed chaired the "businessmen's
committee" that made recommendation's to the General Assembly about government
reorganization. The General Assembly adopted the committee's suggestions to abolish and
consolidate the state's numerous agencies. Despite his concern with economy and efficiency,
Byrd did not reform the inefficient county governments. Byrd and Reed shared similar
viewpoints and realized that any modification to county government would jeopardize the
Organization's alliance with the "courthouse rings."
Before Byrd's reforms could take place, voters had to approve the proposed changes to the
state constitution. Byrd campaigned throughout the state to educate voters about the
constitutional amendments, especially the controversial short ballot proposal. Critics feared that
the short ballot would give the governor excessive power, but Byrd argued that it would only
make government more efficient. When the amendments passed, Byrd's leadership and political
abilities were praised. Byrd earned additional commendation for his "Program of Progress"
which aimed to promote economic development in the state. Byrd proposed appropriations for
the Shenandoah National Park, increased funding for schools and hospitals, additional road
construction, and tax reductions.
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In additional to his statewide popularity, Byrd received national attention for his
accomplishments. Voters voiced their approval of the Byrd administration when they elected
John Garland Pollard, who had campaigned on Byrd's record as governor. Pollard's victory
reassured those who feared that the Democratic losses of the previous year signaled a
dissatisfaction with the Byrd Organization.
Indeed, the Byrd Organization remained the dominant force in Virginia politics. Those who
disagreed with the policies of the Organization often could not participate in politics due to the
state's restricted electorate. Governor Byrd's leadership was described as progressive, however,
there were limits to his progressivism. The Organization ignored social services and placed
priority on maintaining Byrd's pay-as-you-go policy.
When Byrd entered the United States Senate, his association with progressivism began to
fade. Although Byrd supported Roosevelt during the emergency of the "Hundred Days," he soon
became one of the administration's fiercest opponents. Byrd first opposed the New Deal in 1934,
when he criticized proposed amendments to the AAA. He objected to the growing bureaucracy
that he believed would destroy individual liberty. Byrd continually asserted that only a balanced
budget and economy and efficiency would revive the nation's economy.
The Byrd Organization refused to participate in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
(FERA), even though Virginia was financially able to do so. Senators Byrd and Glass and
Governor Peery maintained that highway work would provide adequate relief for the state's
needy. Byrd continued his opposition to the New Deal when he attacked the administration's
$4.8 million work bill. According to Byrd, the deficit spending associated with this bill would
destroy business confidence and endanger future generations. The state press and the opponents
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of the Organization also attacked Byrd's and Peery's unwillingness to accept the necessity of a
social security system. Virginia lagged behind other states that had already created old age
pensions and unemployment insurance plans.
Throughout the New Deal, Byrd remained committed to "industry, economy and self
reliance." He defended his fiscal conservatism from critics who argued that it was antiquated
and ill-suited to the realities of modern America. Byrd placed his trust in states' rights,
individualism, balanced budgets, low taxes, and economy. He wanted to rid the federal
government of bureaucracy and concentrated power. If Byrd had his way, the nation would have
adopted the pay-as-you-go policy of Virginia.
Byrd, one of the original conservative opponents of the New Deal, soon was joined by other
congressmen who objected to the liberalism of the Roosevelt administration. The president's
misguided attempts to pack the Supreme Court and purge conservative Democrats from office
only served to unify the opponents of the New Deal. Byrd was at the core of this conservative
opposition to the New Deal. Although the strength of this coalition varied from issue to issue,
Senator Byrd could be counted on to consistently oppose the Roosevelt administration.
Once characterized as a progressive, Byrd's conservatism had reasserted itself as the role of
government expanded. Byrd had always believed in balanced budgets, individualism, and
economical government. The New Deal had rejected these principles and Byrd's unyielding
committment to them made him appear to be more reactionary than ever. Fiscal conservatism
had also guided Byrd's governorship, yet his term in office earned him statewide praise and
national recognition. There were limits to his progressivism, but Byrd had been an active
governor who accomplished his goals of tax reform, government organization, and economic
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development. Byrd had "stopped growing" once he entered the senate. The Great Depression
and the New Deal changed the way the national government functioned. Byrd approached the
problems of modem America with a philosophy linked to the past instead of the future.
In the years following the New Deal, the Byrd Organization continued to lead Virginia on a
conservative course. Limited by the poll tax, voter apathy, and the "courthouse rings," the small
electorate approved of the Organization's conservatism and its policies favoring the wealthy and
powerful. Byrd continued to neglect the "have-nots," who were denied access to their state
government. Under the leadership of the Organization, Virginia's funding of education, health,
and other social services ranked among the lowest in the nation. As he had done during
Roosevelt's New Deal, Byrd opposed the social reforms of Harry Truman's "Fair Deal" and
Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society." Advocating a policy of "massive resistance," the Byrd
Organization led the effort to resist school desegregation in Virginia.'
Byrd, however, could not halt the modernization of his state. Virginia, like the nation as a
whole, had prospered in the post-war era. Urbanization and population growth transformed
Virginia into a state that was beginning to sever its ties with the Organization. The civil rights
legislation of the 1960s and the adoption of the twenty-fourth amendment, which outlawed the
poll tax, further weakened the Byrd Organization. Byrd's retirement from the senate in 1965 and
his death the following year signaled an end to the conservative rule that governed Virginia
throughout the twentieth century. Byrd had led the Organization to its greatest successes, but his
failure to adapt his principles to a changing society meant that Byrd's Organization could no
longer survive.
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